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The problem. The role of the frontier Indian agent 
is not always adequately understood. Acting as an 
intermediary between the fe~eral government and the Indians, 
the agent's position was unlque. Joseph Montfort Street was 
an Indian agent from 1827 to 1840. An examination of 
street's unusually long tenure as an agent, thirteen years, 
will shed considerable light on the frontier agents' posi­
tion, the role he played in frontier Indian affairs, and 
provide a highly informative picture of Street himself. 
Procedure. Using secondary sources as an initial 
groundwork, the vast majority of the research involved dealt 
with primary materials. These were nearly completely com­
posed of National Archives microfilm records of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs for the years 1827-1840. Other primary 
sources were employed to supplement those microfilm sources. 
Conclusions. Joseph Montfort Street was an honest and 
dedicated Indian agent who wrestled with white antipathy to 
the Indians, governmental misdirection, nebulous Indian laws, 
and the unscrupulous graspings of white fur traders to aid 
the Indians under his charge. Street believed that only 
Indian removal from uncomfortable proximity to whites, com­
bined with education and agricultural instruction, would save 
the Indians from extinction. Street's pro-Indian attitude 
created white antagonism towards him, but he tirelessly 
labored to better the Indian's lot, and earned the trust and 
respect of the Indians. 
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Figure 1. Joseph Montfort Street. 
Reprinted from William B. street, "General Joseph M. street," 
Annals of Iowa, Third Series, TI, (1895h~p. 81. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A host of problems confronted the United states at its 
~neeption under the Constitution in 1789. Those problems 
"ere as varied as they were complex, and cut across the broad 
~pectrum of American society in every conceivable area. One 
bi the more apparent, and decidedly pressing problems, was 
bhat of the Indian. 
From the first permanent settlement in America early 
~n the seventeenth century, the same question was asked time 
and again! What was to be done with the Indians? At the 
founding of the United States, recurring Indian wars, com­
bined with a general friction between the westward advancing 
iYhite population and the slowly retreating Indian population, 
bad nearly acted to halt that same expansion inland from the 
ltlantic seacoast. The fledgling government met the diffi­
culty by constant, and often haphazard, improvisation. Under­
atandably, the result was a loose, semi-legal system of rela­
tions carried on with Indian tribes which could be best 
iescribed as confused. No real order, cohEhsion, or direction 
Nas discernible in the melieu. Laws were enacted by Congress 
Late in the eighteenth, and early in the nineteenth centuries 
in an attempt to cope with the problem. Such laws were 
Dften designed to acquire territory from the Indians for 
white settlement and expansion, while at the same time 
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supposedly guaranteeing the sovereignty of basic Indian 
rights which would enable them to pursue their traditional 
mOdes of life. The inherent contradiction of the separate 
elements often led to serious confusion and confrontation on 
both sides. 
Within that tenuous legal framework was created the 
position of the Indian agent. Dealing with the Indian on 
the frontier was the agent's overall responsibility. His 
official duties were performed under the auspices of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs which was created for just that 
purpose and placed under the War Department and its Secretary. 
Many times the agent occupied a post far removed from the 
official policy-making center of Washington City (later 
Washington, District of Columbia). That was a distinct dis­
advantage to the agent in that effective enforcement of 
policy suffered due to extensive delays, poor communications, 
and governmental incompetence. Too often the Indian agent 
found the solution to a problem delayed for months on account 
of factors like geographic liabilities and postal irregular­
ities. 
And if domestic and logistical stumbling blocks were 
not sufficiently potent to hinder the agent's performance, 
prevailing attitudes among whites in relationship to the 
Indians were additional and formidable obstacles with which 
the agent was compelled to deal. Settlement, growth, and 
westward expansion were the bywords of the 1820's, 1830's, 
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and 1840's. Consequently, the Indians experienced unrelent­
ing white pressure which,although checked for a time by 
savage resistance, continued unabated upon their lands and 
their lives. Regardless of either morality or federal 
statute to the contrary, the expansion-minded American of 
the period was determined to wander wherever he felt the 
urge to go, even if that same drive resulted in the loss of 
Indian tribal lands, Indian rights, or Indian lives. The 
Indian and his culture, lifestyle, and in fact, his very 
presence, were viewed simultaneously merely as a hindrance 
to the fulfillment of a divine plan of greatness awaiting 
the nation. Consequently, injustices perpetrated upon the 
Indians were looked upon with indifference by whites. Ex­
pediency became the watchword for an expanding American 
where the demoralization, SUbjugation, and extinction of the 
Indians was of little consequence. 
Installed as a theoretical bulwark against those pre­
vailing beliefs was the Indian agent. Among his varied 
duties, the preservation of the Indian tribes by the enforce­
ment of protective federal legislation was of signal impor­
tance. In short, the Indian agent acted as a middleman be­
tween governmental policy on the one hand, and the Indians 
inhabiting frontier regions on the other. Unfortunately, the 
agent was oftentimes unable to accomplish the positive ends 
with which he was charged. White American society was simply 
unsympathetic to the situation in which the Indian population 
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found itself. Indians were inexorably pushed farther and 
farther westward by the encroachment of white settlers until 
by the second quarter of the nineteenth century, they found 
themselves backed up against the Mississippi River itself. 
In addition to the pioneer farmers, another group on 
the frontier, the fur traders, exerted a disruptive influ­
ence upon federal-Indian relationships. In the vanguard of 
westward movement, the fur traders exchanged goods on credit 
for the promise of payment in furs by the Indians. Fur 
traders became an integral, and in a broad sense essential, 
part of the frontier. This group, too, frequently operated 
at cross-purposes to the activities and duties of the agent. 
Their motivation was of a purely selfish nature. Desiring 
to maintain the Indian as a nomadic hunter in order to in­
sure a continuous supply of furs, the traders utilized every 
conceivable device to effect that end. One of their most 
effective (and destructive) devices was liquor. The result 
was the continued exploitation of the Indian brought about 
by his inability to hold liquor, while at the same time un­
able to resist the damning urge to imbibe. The maintenance 
of the Indian as a hunter and trapper, spurred on by the 
pressing need to satisfy his credit accounts, was almost 
guaranteed. 
The press of white civilization and the exploitative 
nature of the fur trader functioned as irritants on the 
frontier. By no means a complete roster of problem areas 
5 
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Figure 2. The Upper Mississippi Military Frontier. 
Reprinted from William J. Peterson, The Story of Iowa, Vol. 
I, p. 253. 
6 
facing the agent, they nevertheless presented the most ser­
ious challenge to his effectiveness. Therefore, it was 
hardly surprising to find a lack of concern and dedication 
on the part of some agents. Frequently political appointees 
or merely those filling the position to collect a salary, 
the Indian agent in many cases had the reputation of being 
dishonest, unscrupulous, or both. In some instances, he was 
clandestinely employed by a fur company. Promoting the in­
terests of the company through a position of public trust 
did little to enhance the agent's effectiveness or credibil­
ity. The American Fur Company was a gigantic concern which 
enjoyed a complete monopoly of the fur trade after the mid­
1820's, especially in the Mississippi Valley region. Exer­
cising vast influence augmented by. collaborating agents,the 
American Fur Company controlled the fur trade through a 
usurious credit system which kept the Indians dependent upon 
credit for survival, almost constantly on the hunt, and 
permanently in debt. 
Notable exceptions to the dishonesty among Indian 
agents did occur, however. A conscientious and dedicated 
group of agents sought to transform the Indians into II c ivil­
ized tl farmers and mechanics and endeavored to break the 
stranglehold of such vested interests as the American Fur 
Company over the Indians. One of those men, Joseph Montfort 
street, was noted for his singular honesty and sincere efforts 
to ameliorate the harsh situation which engulfed the Indians. 
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First as a Winnebago Indian agent. and later as a Sac and
 
Fox Indian agent, street labored through the years from 1827
 
to 1840 to improve the lot of Indians under his supervision.
 
Although hampered by governmental misdirection, white animos­

ity, and the entrenched interests of the American Fur Com­

pany, Street consistently acted in the best interests (as
 
he defined them) of the Indians.
 
A close scrutiny of the period will reveal the pre­
vailing frontier forces and conditions that influenced 
Street's effectiveness as an agent. Such an inquiry will 
hopefully increase understanding of the complexities of the 
Indian problem and the difficult role of the Indian agent. 
Viewed within the overall context of street's position, the 
problems he faced, and his relationship to the Indians, the 
period and street's representative role as an Indian agent 
will assume greater clarity. 
The secondary sources used were generally of a supple­
mentary nature (with the exception of Chapter I), and served 
to augment the bulk of primary sources utilized. Articles 
in periodicals were employed, but were limited as to scope 
and content. The majority of the secondary sources used were 
found in the Drake University Library, with others acquired 
through Inter-Library Loan. 
Basically, the bulk of the sources used were primary 
sources, and consisted of microfilm records. Augmenting 
those records were non-microfilm sources utilized at the Iowa 
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State Department of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa. 
Those consisted of the Joseph Montfort Street Letterbook, as 
well as other uncollected documents. Most of the primary 
sources were Bureau of Indian Affairs records covering the 
years 1827-1840. Those microfilm records of the original 
documents held by the National Archives in Washington, D.C., 
were secured through the National Archives regional deposi­
tory in Kansas City, Missouri, and included letters both to, 
and from, street. and other individuals as well. Letters 
sent from Washington (Series M21) were indexed and each roll 
contained in the neighborhood of 400 pieces of information. 
The letters received (Series M234) were indexed on other 
rolls, but were quite often misarranged chronologically. 
Each roll had to be individually inspected, piece by piece, 
to assure that no pertinent information would be overlooked. 
Those rolls each contained approximately 900-1200 pieces of 
information. However, the depth and value of the primary 
information obtained made the search extremely worthwhile. 
CHAPTER II 
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1789-1834 
Congress enacted a wide variety of legislation be­
tween 1789 and 1834 to regulate Indian affairs. That legis­
lation was only thinly rooted in British colonial antecedents. 
Regulation of Indian affairs in pre-Revolutionary War 
America was inadequate and generally a complete failure. 
Licensing of traders was its major feature, one which pro­
cured neither reputable traders nor effective Indian protec­
tion. Closer examination of post-Revolutionary War laws 
reveals basic weaknesses such as lack of authority and con­
fusion in policy-making. Congress rectified those weaknesses 
in 1834 when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.) came into 
existence. 
The Act of August 7, 1789, created the War Department, 
marks the first step in the development of federal machinery 
to administer Indian affairs. The law placed the regulation 
and maintenance of Indian affairs under War Department juris­
diction, simply for lack of a more fitting Placement. 1 The 
Bureau created was called the Office of Indian Affairs (O.I.A.) 
until 1824, when the designation was changed to Bureau of 
Office of Indian 
Oranization (Baltimore: 
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Indian Affairs, a change legalized by statute in 1834.2 
Congress passed several laws during the last decade 
of the eighteenth century governing Indian relations. The 
Act of JUly 22, 1790, called the Trade and Intercourse Act 
of July 22, 1790, was grounded in the Constitutional provi­
sian that Congress possessed tI ••• the power to regulate com­
merce •••with the Indian tribes. IIJ The law provided for 
regulation of the Indian trade, and included provisions pro­
tecting the sovereignty of Indian lands and guaranteeing 
prosecution of those who committed crimes against Indians, 
particularly white men accused of trespassing on Indian 
lands. 4 
On March 1, 1793, Congress enacted the Second Inter­
course Act. It added few new provisions to the Act of 1790, 
but prohibited settlement on Indian lands, granted authority 
to the president to remove intruders from Indian lands, and 
forbade any governmental employee engaged in Indian affairs 
from having " ••• any interest or concern in any trade with the 
Indians.,,5 One major addition empowered the president " ••• to 
2schmeckebier, Opt cit., p. 27. 
3Felix S. Cohen, Handpook of Federal Indian Law 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1942), p. 69. 
5Ibid ., p. 70. 
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appoint such persons, from time to time, as temporary agents, 
to reside among the Indians, as he shall think proper.,,6 
Eventually, the Indian agent was appointed on a permanent 
basis as temporary labels were dropped. Included among the 
second act's provisions were general guidelines for the 
agent's duties. Agents were impressed with the need for 
civilizing Indians through agriculture and "mechanic arts" 
like blacksmithing and carpentry. Other, more general, 
instructions called upon the agent to maintain the confidence 
of the Indians, thereby keeping them attached to the United 
States and impressed with the government's firm desire to 
maintain peace and justice. Beyond those general instruc­
tions the agent, under the supervision of his respective 
territorial governor, was charged with responsibility for 
reporting conditions among the Indians, happenings at his 
agency. and progress made towards civilization of the Indians. 7 
After 1800, Congress enacted more far-reaching legisla­
tion to deal with Indian relations, but the nebulous author­
ity of the O.I.A. was of such a quasi-legal nature that it 
wielded little power. Relegated as it was under War Depart­
ment authority, the O.I.A. possessed legislated powers, but 
6prancis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formulative Years (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
19~2), pp. 53-54. 
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lacked meaningful enforcement machinery. Therefore, actual 
dealings with the Indians fell to the agent. Success or 
failure rested heavily upon his character, the respect he 
won from the tribes with whom he lived, and such authority 
as his position held in the eyes of white men on the fron­
8tier. Instructions sent to agents in 1802 detailed a com­
prehensive and idealistic statement of the agent's role: 
The motives of the Government for sending agents 
to reside with the Indian Nations, are the cultiva­
tion of peace and harmony between the U.States, and 
the Indian Nations generally; the detection of any 
improper conduct in the Indians, or the citizens of 
the U.States, or others relating to the Indians, or 
their lands, and the introduction of the Arts of 
Husbandry and domestic manufactures, as well as pro­
viding, and diffusing the blessings attached to a 
well-regulated society.9 
That statement represented optimistic hopes for Indian civil­
ization and provided a sweeping view of the agent's responsi­
bilities. 
Congress created the Office of Superintendent of Indian 
Trade on April 21, 1806. Ostensibly formed to oversee the 
"factory system", the Secretary of War depended increasingly 
on that office as the scope of Indian regulation broadened. 
The factory system harked back to the Revolutionary War 
period, and reflected a desire on the government's part to 
undertake increased control of all aspects of Indian affairs. 
(3. • 56Prucha, op. clt., p. • 
9Ibid ., p. 51. 
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Through the factory system, the government purchased finished 
goods, transported them to the frontier, and controlled their 
sale to the Indians to prevent dishonest traders from bilking 
furs from the Indians at unfair prices. While he had no 
official power to act in Indian affairs, the Superintendent 
of Indian Trade became the unofficial focus of Indian rela­
tions. 10 Thomas L. McKenney, destined to head the future 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, represented a notable holder of 
that office. A man deeply concerned with improving condi­
tions among Indians, McKenney served as superintendent from 
1816 until 1822, when the post was abolished. 
Congress formulated the garrison, or outpost, system 
early in the nineteenth century. Military outposts were 
constructed, and their commanders were instructed, to assist 
Indian agents at frontier agencies. The War Department out­
lined cooperation between the agent and military by direc­
tives; military forces aided the agent in enforcing treaties, 
protecting the sovereignty of Indian lands and lives, and in 
general, serving in a supportive capacity as to the perform­
ance of the agent's official duties. Jealousy sometimes 
flared due to conflicts of authority. Army officers were 
often sensitive about taking orders from civilian Indian 
agents. In general, military commanders enforced Indian 
10prucha, Opt cit., p. 56. 
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policy in conjunction with the agent, and were capable. 
ardent supporters of governmental policy.11 
By 1824, ambiguity surrounding O.I.A. powers. posi­
tion. and function gave rise to a welter of confusion. 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun attempted to solve the com­
plicated situation. On March 11. 1824, Calhoun created the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs at his own instigation (without 
Congressional sanction) to handle Indian affairs, and Congress 
appointed Thomas L. McKenney superintendent of that new 
bureau. As head of the B.I.A., Congress charged McKenney 
with responsibility for appropriations of annuities and cur­
rent expenses, examination and approval of all vouchers for 
expenditures by agents, administering funds for Indian 
civilization, deciding on claims between whites and Indians, 
and handling all ordinary correspondence of the War Depart­
12
ment. McKenney undertook his new position with enthusiasm. 
In a report to Calhoun in 1825. pertaining to Indians who 
had voluntarily given up claims to tribal lands by treaty and 
elected to move. McKenney stated it was ·' ••• the policy of the 
Government to guarantee to them lasting and undisturbed pos­
session" of their new lands west of the Mississippi River. 
McKenney felt the benefits of increased Indian education 
I1p~ h . true a, Opt C1 " pp. 61-65· 
12Ibid ., pp. 57-58. 
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would be substantial. He viewed returning India.n students 
as necessary intermediaries between savagery and civiliza­
tion. 1) 
McKenney's enthusiasm. was short-lived. He discovered 
that the B.I.A. was delegated all work involved in adminis­
tering Indian affairs, but lacked actual power to act as an 
official agency. Because of its status as a War Department 
subsidiary, the B.I.A.'s effectiveness was sharply limited. 
Prompted by that discovery, McKenney conceived a bill advo­
cating a strong, revamped B.I.A. and submitted it to Congress 
on March )1, 1826. Attempts to move the bill out of com­
mittee failed due to meagre support, and it died. Many of 
McKenney's proposals would be included in a significant re­
port submitted several years later in 1829. which laid the 
foundation for the B.I.A,'s eventual reorganization in 1834.14 
Before the frustrated McKenney resigned his position 
in 18)0, he realized the Bureau of Indian Affairs lacked con­
crete policy and basic coordination. Secretary of War Peter 
Porter concurred. Porter wrote in 1828, expressing his 
views on Indian affairs I 
The policy of the government on the subject of
 
its Indian relations, as indicated by our various
 
treaties with that people. and by the laws regu­

lating our intercourse with them, has never been
 
13Cohen, Ope cit., p. 12. 
14prucha, Opt cit., pp. 58-59. 
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very distinctly marked; nor, indeed has it at
 
different times been very uniform or consistent
 
in its character. The regulations, too. of the
 
Department, sofaras it may be said to have any,
 
have been equally undefined and vacillating; and
 
there appears to have been scarcely any other
 
rule to guide the officers, and the agents in
 
the discharge of their functions--particularly
 
to the disbursement and application of the con­

tingent fund--than fheir own several notions of
 justice and policy. 5 
Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, himself an Indian agent, colorfully 
described the situation. 
The derangements in the fiscal affairs of the 
Indian department are in the extreme. One would 
think that appropriations had been handled with a 
pitchfork. A correspondent writes. "For 1827 we 
were promised $48,000 and received $30,000. For 
1828 we were promised $40,000 and have received 
$25.000 ••• It is impossible that this can continue." 
And these derangements are only with regard to the 
north. How the south and west stand it is impos­
sible to say. But there is a screw loose in the 
public machinery somewhere. 16 
A collective, coherent policy was needed to institute order 
in Indian affairs. Andrew Jackson and Indian removal initi­
ated a move to satisfy those requisites. 
The policy of removal. whereby Indians exchanged trib­
al lands within the United states for lands west of the 
Mississippi, was not unique to Jackson. Removal had origin­
ated with Thomas Jefferson in 1803, when the addition of the 
vast Louisiana Territory created conditions that made removal 
15prucha, Ope cit., p. 250. 
16schmeckebier, lac. cit. 
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feasible. 17 Removal surfaced during James Monroe's adminis­
tration following the War of 1812. By the 1820's, several 
Southern tribes, notably the Cherokee, had begun to adopt 
white customs and society. However, their attempts to 
establish an independent nation within the United States 
brought them into sharp conflict with the state of Georgia. 
Since the federal government had failed to extinguish Indian 
land claims in Georgia (as per agreements reached in an 
April 24, 1802 compact between the United States and 
Georgia18 ), the Georgia legislature decreed on December 20, 
1828, that all Indian residents would come under its juris­
diction within six months. John Quincy Adams' administra­
tion refused to interfere in the matter. Instead, Adams 
advocated moving tribes west of the Mississippi in exchange 
for lands of the Eastern Indians.19 Those new lands were to 
be located west of Missouri and Arkansas on the Mississippi's 
west bank. 20 Adams favored negotiations which would have 
respected tribal rights to ratify or refuse to sign treaties, 
a position viewed as too lenient by Southerners. 21 
17prucha, Opt cit., p. 226. 
19Ronald N. Satz, "Federal Indian Policy, 1829-1849 11 
(unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of Maryland, 
1972), p. 8. 
20Ibid • 21 b'd 9 0I 1 ., pp. -1. 
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Andrew Jackson's election to the presidency in 1828 
added impetus to removal and devolved a more coherent, work­
able plan to effect it. Jackson was not an "Indian-haterll • 
Rather, he was deeply concerned with national growth, unity, 
and security. Jackson believed the Indian held merely a 
possessory right to their lands, and were sUbject to American 
sovereignty. Viewing the treaty-making process as absurd, 
Jackson favored a policy which forced Indians to emigrate 
outside the United States' boundaries. In return, Indian 
22tribes would receive tracts in the trans-Mississippi west. 
Adams' plan had been basically the same. Jackson additional­
ly urged individual allotments for Indians who remained in 
the East and became citizens of their respective states. 
He believed only well-educated and property-minded Indians 
would elect to follow that course, however, and the numbers 
would be small. 23 Jackson felt removal would be of great 
benefit to the Indians; removal was not a dishonest attempt 
to cheat Indians, as preservation of their rights occurred 
throughout the entire process. Jackson stated in his first 
inaugural address in 1829 thatc 
••• it will be my sincere and constant desire to ob­
serve towards the Indian tribes within our limits a 
just and liberal policy, and give that humane and 
considerate attention to their rights and their 
22Satz , Ope cit., p. 10. 
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wants which is consistent with the habits. of our 
Government and the wishes of our people.:G4 
Jackson's seeming indifference to the Indian's plight, not­
withstanding his public declarations, combined with a gen­
eral Indian refusal to vacate their homelands, and led to 
his acrimonious denunciation by religious and humanitarian 
groups. Congregationalists strongly protested against 
sending Indians into the supposed "Great American Desert ll 
of the trans-Mississippi region; they fervently believed 
Indians would perish in th*t IIwasteland". Moreover, poli­
tical opposition to Jackson found expedient expression in 
removal debates. Anti-Jackson National Republicans railed 
against Jackson's alleged cruelty, charging that he had 
failed to uphold guaranteed Indian rights. 25 
Misdirection and mistrust of Jackson's removal policy 
painfUlly accentuated the need for a comprehensive, accept­
able Indian policy. While removal established broad, general 
guidelines, effective machinery for day-to-day enforcement 
was inadequate. Congress took a faltering step to correct 
the situation and systematize Indian affairs by the Act of 
July 9, 1832, which established the post of Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs. The law empowered the president to appoint 
a commissioner (under the Secretary of War), who was 
24 'tSatz, op. C1 ., p. 16. 
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entrusted with n ••• the direction and management of all 
Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out of Indian 
relations.,,26 The law also invested the president with the 
power to discontinue agencies, along with accompanying 
agents, sUbagents, and interpreters, for reason of Indian 
27emigration, or any other cause. 
While national attention shifted to the nullification 
crisis with South Carolina during the winter of 1832-18)3, 
confusion and indirection continued to plague the B.I.A. In 
1834, Congress enacted two important pieces of legislation 
which increased governmental control of the Indian trade, 
broadened the scope of the agent's authority, and formally 
established the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Congress estab­
lished the B.!.A. on a legally constituted basis, a marked 
departure from its former quasi-legal, "after-thought" 
status. A report compiled and submitted to Congress in 1829 
had laid the groundwork for the 1834 laws. William Clark 
and Lewis Cass, two men well-acquainted with the broad 
spectrum of Indian relations, composed the report at the 
behest of incoming Secretary of War Peter Porter, who in 
1828 had remarked about his new appointment. 
26prucha, Opt cit., PP' 58-59. 
27Cohen, Opt cit., p. ?J. 
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••• 1 have found no portion of its extensive and 
complicated duties so perplexing, and the per­
formance of which has been less welcome, than 
those wh~§h appertain to the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs. 
Clark and Cass responded energetically. They submitted a 
bill which incorporated older Indian laws, as well as sev­
eral innovative ideas designed to alleviate the B.l.A.'s 
hodge-podge composition. The new concepts related to the 
agent and his duties, giving him broader powers and increased 
discretion to handle frontier Indian relations. 29 Disappoint­
ment was Clark's and Cass' reward for their efforts. Congress 
ignored the bill and it died, only to resurface in 1834. 
Congressional attention was again drawn to Indian af­
fairs by a full-scale report sUbmitted by the House Committee 
on Indian Affairs on May 20, 1834. The committee called for 
a complete reorganization of Indian affairs and a restate­
ment of Indian pOlicy.30 In general, the report, and 
accompanying legislation, provided for a reorganized Indian 
department, a new trade and intercourse act, and the organi­
zation of a western territory for displaced Indians. 
Frustration marked the committee's labors; indeed, 
its report to Congress succinctly outlined the staggering 
difficulties encountered in rationally handling Indian 
28prucha, Ope cit., p. 252. 
29Ibid., pp. 253-254. 30Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
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relations I 
The co~ittee has sought, in vain, for any law­
ful author1ty for the appointment of a majority of 
the agents and sUbagents of Indian affairs now in 
office. For years, usage, rendered colorably law­
ful only by reference to indirect and equivocal 
legislation, has been the only sanction for their 
appointment. Our Indian relations commenced at an 
early period of the revolutionary war. What was 
necessary to be done, either for defence or con­
ciliation, was done; and being necessary, no inquiry 
seems to have been made as to the authority under 
which it was done. 3! 
On June 30, 1834, Congress enacted two bills. The 
first, called the Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, 
relied heavily upon the 1829 proposals of Clark and Casso 
Basically a measure to regUlate Indian trade, the law gave 
individual agents expressed powers and substantially broad­
ened their authority. Agents were empowered to issue licenses 
to traders, while retaining the right to refuse issuance of 
the samel 
••• if he is satisfied that the applicant is a per­
son of bad character, or that it would be improper 
to permit him to reside in the Indian country, or 
if a license, previously granted to such applicant, 
has bee2 revoked or a forfeiture of his bond de­
creed.) 
Violators of trade regUlations were SUbject to forfeiture of 
bond, fines. and loss of all trading goods. 33 Inequities 
within the fur trade were recognized. Unfair practices by 
31prucha, Opt cit., p. 51. 
33Ibid ., pp. 262-263. 
23 
F 
fur traders resulted in stricter licensing because the 
" ••• Indians do not meet traders on equal terms, and no doubt 
have much reason to complain of fraud and imposition. 1I34 
The accused party could appeal the decision, and the Indian 
agent bore the burden of proof. 3.5 The act prohibited hunt­
ing or trapping by whites on Indian lands, prevent livestock 
grazing on those lands, and prevent illegal settlement on 
Indian lands. 36 Violators were not SUbject to punishment 
other than fines, a point which demonstrated apparent Con­
gressional unwillingness to safeguard Indian rights by more 
forceful measures. Local military forces shouldered respon­
sibility for the act's enforcement. They WeI'S ordered to 
act in conjunction with the agent to uphold Indian rights,37 
The second measure dealt with the B.I.A.'s organiza­
tion and functions. finally bestowing upon the bureau legis­
lative sanction where before it had existed of "doubtful 
origin and authority.,,38 By establishing a permanent agency 
to deal with Indian affairs, Congress transformed the B.l.A.'s 
34cohen, loco cit. 
3.5Ibid • 
36prucha. Opt cit., pp. 26J-264. 
37Ibid • , pp. 265-269. 
~8Cohen, op. cit. , p. 74.J 
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non-official. quasi-legal status; a viable agency designed 
to perform an essential task was formed. The second act of 
June 30, 1834. delegated actual authority to the B.I.A. Not 
only did it regularize the B.!.A.'s internal activities. 
but gave it authority to determine and enforce Indian policy. 
The acts reduced confusion surrounding the B.I.A.'s nebulous 
character. Lewis Cass. who by 18)4 had been appointed Secre­
tary of War, summarized the effects of both acts in his 
annual report for that year. 
The acts of the last session of Congress on the 
subject of Indian affairs, have introduced impor­
tant changes into those relations. Many of the 
provisions of former laws had become inappropriate 
or inadequate and not suited to the channel which 
time and circumstance had made. In the act regu­
lating the intercourse with the vaTious tribes. the 
principles of intercommunication with them are laid 
down. and the necessary details provided.39 
By 18)4. the groundwork for a revamped Bureau of 
Indian Affairs was laid. The B.I.A.'s after-thought com­
plexion was supplanted by a regUlarized organization sanc­
tioned by federal statute. resulting in a strengthened 
Indian policy. However. the agent's problems were not 
totally solved by improved legislation. He continued to 
experience difficulties which. while not as severe as before. 
still presented formidable challenges. 
39prucha. Ope cit •• p. 250. 
CHAPTER III 
PRAIRIE DU CHIEN, 1827-18)2 
One Indian agent appointed during the 1820's was 
Joseph Montfort street. Appointed by John Quincy Adams in 
August, 1827, street became the Winnebago Indian .agent at 
Prairie du Chien near the fork of the Wisconsin and 
Mississippi Rivers. Prairie du Chien was far-removed from 
Lunenburg County, Virginia, where Street was born on December 
18, 1782, the son of a prosperous farmer. As a young man, 
street moved to Richmond where he entered a commercial 
establishment. While in Richrnon4, Street became acquainted 
with one John Woods. Following Street's study of law under 
Henry Clay in Kentucky, Woods and Street pUblished the news­
paper Western World in Frankfort, Kentucky, beginning pub­
lication in JUly, 1806.1 Allegations in the Western World 
against Aaron Burr and his questionable western intrigues 
forced Burr to appear before a grand jury twice in 1806. 2 
Attacks on other prominent Kentuckians led to incidents 
involving both Woods and Street, the leiter fighting several 
duels over Western World charges. Local pressure and a 
1"JoSeph Montfort street," National Cyclopedia of 
American BiograEhy, XIII, 56. 
2K atherine Elizabeth Crane , "Joseph Nlontfort 
Street," DAB, XVIII, 136. 
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falling-out with Woods combined to force the newspaper and 
street out of business in 1807. Married in 1809, he 
migrated to Shawneetown, Illinois, in 1812 with his wife a.nd 
the first of their fourteen children.) At Shawneetown, 
street became a local leader, holding at various times the 
positions of clerk"'" of court, postmaster, and brigadier­
general in the local rnilitia.4 The last position resulted 
in his being called "General ll street for the rest of his 
life. It was while street was a resident of Shawneetown that 
Adams, at Clay's recommendation, appointed him Indian agent 
at Prairie du Chien. 
street received his appointment on August 8, 1827. 
War Department instructions ordered him to proceed immedi­
ately to Prairie du Chien and undertake his official duties 
there. Street was instructed to submit quarterly financial 
reports and post bond to guarantee the faithful discharge 
5of his duties; his salary was set at $1200 per annum. 
Street soon familiarized himself with agency routine 
and began reporting agency conditions to the War Department. 
3Crane, Opt cit., p. 137. 
5James Barbour to Joseph Montfort Street, August 8, 
1827; Bureau of Indian Affairs; Letters Sent 1824-1881; 
National Archives, Record Group 75; Series 1. Roll 4, pp. 
105-106. (Hereinafter referred to as 1.) 
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Imbued with a "sense of mission," street arrived at Prairie 
du Chien intent upon improving the Indian's lot. The Indian, 
street felt, was most effectively controlled when treated 
justly, but firmly. It was: 
••• the policy of our Government, that this should 
be done in such ways, as at once to impress Indians 
with a deep sense of our kind hospitality & friend­
ship to such as were faithful-& of our powers and 
resources if compelled tg.. use them against those who 
were base and faithless. 
street realized that maintaining frontier peace was an un­
certain task. He stated that predicting the chances for peace 
7was " ••• beyond a reasonable and prudent calculation ... 
Street based his pessimistic declaration upon first­
hand evidence. A primary source of Indian-white friction 
stemmed from whites, who, in search of lead, trespassed on 
Indian lands. Lead had been mined in the region for well 
over a hundred years and continued at the time of Street's 
appointment in 1827. In the summer of 1827, a party of at 
least eighty miners, led by Henry Dodge, entered Indian 
8lands, determined to hold their lead claims at all costs.
6JoSeph Montfort street to Secretary of War, November 
15, 1827; Bureau of Indian Affairs: Letters Received, 1824­
1881; National Archives, Record Group 75: Series M234, Roll 
696. (Hereinafter referred to as M2)4.) 
8prancis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formulative Years (Cambridges Harvard University Press, 
1962), pp. 179-180. 
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Dodge claimed that agreements with several Indian tribes, 
inclUding the 'Winnebago, secured his claim. However, be­
cause Dodge lacked the necessary governmental sanction, 
Street acted. He wrote the War Department on November 15, 
1827, suggesting that the United states bUy the disputed 
Indian lands and thus insure frontier peace. Street stated 
that the area had grown unsuitable for Indian habitation; 
inrushing torrents of miners (estimated to have numbered 
2000 in 1827, and 10,000 only one year later) frightened away 
much of the area's game. street hoped that purchase would 
produce additional benefits as " ••• the Indians removed from 
the vicinity of whites would no longer see the worst side 
of our character exhibited in the many adventurers flocking 
to the mines. 1I10 Street thus believed that the whites were 
primarily responsible for Indian problems in his district. 
Withdrawing the Indians from uncomfortable closeness to 
whites would advance their civilization. 
Dodge and the miners refused to vacate the lead min­
ing region. Acting under Street's orders, subagent John 
Marsh journeyed to the mines. Marsh reported that Dodge and 
his men were heavily armed and had constructed wooden forti­
fications: Marsh said they appeared determined to stay. 
9street to Secretary of War, January 8, 1828; 00234, 
Roll 696. 
10street to Secretary of War, November 15, 1827; 
lVl2J4, Roll 696. 
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Street, seeking to avoid a confrontation, gave Dodge some 
leeway for his actions when he said; "He is, I think, !!. 
good-rnan--pecuniarily unfortunate, and I suppose, Malking a 
'bold stroke' for!!. fortune. 1111 Street sUbsequently realized 
that only military force would break the stalemate. He re­
quested 180 soldiers from the Fort Crawford garrison at 
Prairie du Chien in July, 1828, but received only six men 
as an escort. Street's meagre force proved insufficient to 
effect Dodge's removal, and he stayed on Indian lands. The 
stalemate was broken by a temporary agreement reached on 
August 25, 1828, later ratified by formal treaty on August 1, 
1829, which extinguished Indian claims to the region. In­
creased numberS of whites joined the influx thereafter, per­
" 12manently safeguarded by ex post f.. acto sane t l.on. 
street believed that concrete action was necessary 
to prevent a repetition of the Dot;lge incident. street sum­
marized conditions succinctlYI 
Why then should we calculate that uncivilized 
savages, whilst dying with unger & shivering with 
cold, measurably caused by our invasion of their 
country and occupancy of their lands, will bear all 
in peace?l] 
11Street to Secretary of War, January 8, 1828; M234, 
Roll 696. 
12prucha, Ope cit., pp. 180-181. 
lJStreet to Peter Porter, September 26, 1828; M234, 
Roll 696. 
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Indian-white friction plagued Street throughout his thirteen 
year tenure as an Indian agent. 
Lead miners composed only one troublesome white group. 
Fur traders, exchanging goods such as iron, powder, traps, 
salt, blankets, and a myriad of related merchandise, were an 
integral element of the frontier scene. street strongly dis­
trusted fur traders I 
•••who can, with a smiling face, demoralize a whole 
band of Indians, for the sake of 50 or 100 musk­
rat-skins, and chuckle while calculating that the 
1fhiskey thirst is madd~ning him, has cleared 300 
percent upon the cost. l 
Street's bitter accusation referred to the gigantic 
American Fur Company. Originating as John Jacob Astor's 
Southwest Company, it failed due to forced inactivity during 
the War of 1812. Reorganized as the American Fur Company at 
war's end, it merged with the Missouri Company in 1818 to 
form the company's nucleus. The American Fur Company ab­
sorbed smaller companies and independent traders until by the 
time of Astor's retirement in 1834, it enjoyed a complete 
monopoly of the fur trade. 15 That monopoly was spawned, 
nurtured, and maintained by a credit system established by 
the French fur traders in the seventeenth century, in turn 
14street to Barbour, January 8, 1828; M234, Roll 
696. 
15Ida M. street, "Joseph street's Last Fight with the 
Fur Traders," Annals of Iowa, Third Series, XVII (1929). p. 
108. 
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developed and improved by the British in the eighteenth 
century, and systematized by Astor and the Company in the 
nineteenth century. Winter hunts netted the Indians furs, 
pel ts, and dried meat which they exchanged. for manufactured 
"neeessities". Goods purchased on credit each fall were 
paid for with the winter's catch the following spring. As 
the Indians grew more and more dependent upon credit, they 
sank deeper and deeper into drader's debt since the year's 
catch rarely paid their indebtedness on a yearly basis. 16 
Whiskey was common payment for furs as it was easily 
shipped, stored, and dispensed to the Indians. Not only was 
Whiskey a barterable commodity, but its unsettling effects 
prevented Indians from embracing a sedentary, agricultural 
life-style. The trader, by reinforcing the nomadic ways of 
Indians, assured the fur trade's continuance. Whiskey's 
debilitating effects were recognized by the Indians them­
selves. Decori, a Winnebago chief, told street in January, 
18281 liMy heart is sick, when I see Indians drink much 
whiskey. It is not good for Indians. It is not made by 
Indians but white men."l? Another Indian remarked that 
18 
1I ••• furs and skins were given to the trader for hot-poison. 1I 
16Ida M. Street, Ope cit., p. 108. 
17street to Barbour, January 8, 18281 M2J4, Roll 696. 
J2 
The anticipation of whiskey made the Indians virtual prison­
ers of the traders. Consequently, traders charged high, un­
fair prices not only because manufactured goods were un­
available elsewhere, but the promise of whiskey dulled the 
Indian's already weak bargaining powers. Agent Thomas Forsyth 
reported in 1831 that a blanket, a rifle, and one pound of 
shot, which together cost the trader $21 (shipping included), 
collectively cost the Indian $44, a healthy profit which 
19exceeded 100 percent. Profits of that magnitude were com­
monplace; losses suffered through uncollected debts were 
small in comparison. In February, 1831, agent John Kinzie 
pointedly described whiskey's impact on the Indians I IIWith 
the promise of a few bottles of Whiskey, much can be 
20effected. 1I 
The liquor traffic, street believed, was largely 
responsible for Indian instability. He placed the blame for 
the liquor traffic squarely upon the American Fur Company. 
Positive action against whiskey traders was difficult. 
Governmental policy was ineffectual in controlling the liquor 
traffic. street queried the War Department in October, 18)2, 
asking for guidelines to follow when seizing contraband 
19JaCob Van Der Zee, IIFur Trade in the Iowa Country," 
Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XII (1914), pp. 556­
557· 
20John Kinzie to Lewis Cass, February 16, 18)1; ~2)4, 
Roll 696. 
33 
liquor. When so informed, street saidl "You must do me the 
justice to believe that no official of the Government would 
more readily & efficiently act in any such case than my­
self.,,21 Street believed that by utilizing whiskey, Company 
traders wreaked "great injury" upon Indians each year. 
Traders scoffed at governmental efforts to halt the flow of 
illegal liquor into Indian Territory. Street reported to 
the War Department that one trader declared he would import 
liquor regardless of governmental restrictions. 22 
The American Fur Company was the real exploiter, 
•Street felt, and l.quor was one way by which Indians were 
kept dependent upon the company. street acknowledged the 
Company's tremendous power. He strenuously protested in 
October, 1832, against undue Company pressure which unjustly 
influenced treaty negotiations. On October 9, 1832. street 
wrote to his immediate superior, Superin~endent William 
Clark at st. Louis, that the situation warranted investiga­
tiona "I trust. Sir, that you will urge the Govern.'l1ent to 
look into this business. 'There is something rotten in 
Denmark.," 23 street's intense condemnation increased 
throughout 1832. Company traders were persons I 
21street to William Clark, October 9, 18J2; M2J4, 
Roll 728. 
22 ·· b " , 2J I , . dr 10. 01 • 
34 
••• who are by their wealth shoving all other 
traders out of the country-by their merchandise 
& whiskey gaining an influence amongst the Inds. 
And using t~~t influence directly against the 
Government. 
Zachary Taylor, later President of the United states, com­
manded Fort Crawford at Prairie du Chien during part of 
Street's early tenure as agent; Taylor became street's 
staunchest ally against Company machinations. Taylor saids 
"Take the American Fur Company in the aggregate, and they are 
the greatest set of scoundrels the world ever knew. ,,25 Like 
Street, Taylor's comment reflected personal prejudice. 
street's antagonism continued to fester and it remained an 
open sore which troubled street during his thirteen years as 
an Indian agent. 
An incident occurred late in 1829, and dragged on 
through 1832, which served as a catalyst to solidify street's 
burgeoning antipathy to the American Fur Company. The in­
cident demonstrated Street's frustration in the face of 
white insensitivity to Indians. and the agent's awkward, 
intermediary position. 
In December, 1829, Street learned that one Jean Brunet, 
a local Company trader, had left Prairie du Chien to cut 
24street to Vlilliam Clark, October 9, 18]2; M234, 
Roll 728. 
25Holman Hamilton, Zachary Taylor-Soldier of the 
RepUblic, I, (New YorkJ The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), 
p. 115· 
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timber on Indian lands upstream on the Mississippi. Accom­
panied by Major Stephan W. Kearney, then commandant of Fort 
Crawford, Street " •••pursued him next day in person, accom­
panied by a military escort, and arrested him." 26 Cut tim­
ber seized from Brunet was utilized in the construction of a 
new fort at Prairie du Chien. On February 22, 1830, Brunet 
brought suit against Kearney and Street. Brunet cited his 
II illegal" arrest and seizure of his timber as mi tigating 
circumstances. Faced with the unwelcome prospects of a 
spring trial, Street remarked on February 22, 1830' 
••• the spring term of the Court B,$ this place is 
approaching, and I have no prostpect LSi£? of a 
fair trial before the ,Qresiding Judge, from his pre­
vious course, and little hope that an impartial
Jury can be procurred at this place. 27 
James D. Doty, the presiding jUdge, was a man whose extensive 
frontier land holdings left him unsympathetic to either 
Indian land sovereignty or street's predicament. street 
felt any jury chosen would convict him as the local inhabi­
tants were • 
••• principally of ignorant Canadian French, and 
mixed breed Indians, not one of 20 whom can read 
or write. Many of these have been hirelings to go 
with lumber parties, and know little about the law, 
and care less, so long as they are not made to feel 
its penalties~8 Of this motley crew the Jury will 
be •••made up. 
26street to John Eaton, February 22, 1830; M234, 
Roll 696. 
28Prucha, Ope cit., p. 184. 
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Postponements delayed the trial until the spring of 1832. 
street and Kearney were found guilty, and a jUdgment of 
$1411.12 was levied against them. Street reported in October, 
1832, that he was forced to borrow money to settle his half 
of the judgment. Congress had not passed an emergency ap­
propriations bill authorizing payment of the fine, and 
Brunet, earlier satisfied with a payment schedule amicable 
to street's financial situation, demanded immediate payment 
in late September. Brunet had written to Street on 
September 28, 1832, arranging the payments. "The balance 
of the execution you can give me your note if you think 
proper, payable in some reasonable time, and let the execu­
tion be returned satisfied. 1I29 
Within a matter of days, Brunet totally reversed his 
lenient plan and ordered immediate payment by Street. street 
wrote Clark on October 4, 1832, that " •••Brunet issued an 
execution against my body, which could only be satisfied by 
going to jailor paying the money.,,30 Street borrowed the 
necessary funds from a local merchant, John Dowling, who 
allowed Street two months to repay the loan. J1 street 
29Jean Brunet to Street, September 28, 1832; Joseph 
Montfort street Letterbook, held by the Iowa State Depart­
ment of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa, p. 67. (here­
inafter referred to as Letterbook.) 
30street to Clark, October 4, 18J2; M234, Roll 728. 
JILetterbook, lac. cit. 
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theorized why Brunet had changed his initial payment plan. 
"Brunet would willingly wait until I could get the money. 
However, it seems that JUdge Doty, who was here had per­
suaded B. that I had intentionally neglected to get the 
money. 1132 Street denied any attempt on his part to avoid 
payment of the jUdgment, but admitted that pressing agency 
matters (such as the Black Hawk War several months earlier) 
had so occupied his time that " •••1 had in a measure lost 
sight of the judgment.,,3] On October 2J, street received 
War Department notice that Congress had appropriated funds 
to satisfy claims against street and Kearney. The appropri­
ation proved insufficient; street paid nearly $40 to cancel 
the jUdgment. 34 
Street's appraisal of the Brunet affair, particularly 
his firm conviction that Company machinations manifested a 
frontier menace, received additional support. In a letter 
written December 5, 18]2, Street incredulously reported that 
Major Kearney's bail was posted by Joseph Rolette, the local 
agent of the American Fur Company. and brother-in-law of 
Jean Brunet. 35 When Kearney left Prairie du Chien on Military 
J2street to Clark, October 4, 1932 ; M234, Roll 728. 
J4Cass to street. October 23. 18]2; M21, Roll 9, p. 
207· 
35street to Cass. December 5. 18J2; M234. Roll 728. 
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business. Street was left to bear the brunt of the payment 
difficulties alone. Street reached the cbnclusion that 
Brunet's payment turnabout and the posting of K,earney's bail 
later by Rolette were related incidents. The American Fur 
Company wielded its influence to effect Street's removal or 
to discredit him officially because he opposed the Company's 
monopolistic impUlses through his efforts to ameliorate con­
ditions among the Winnebago. Street discovered that enforce­
ment of Indian laws was laden with pitfalls; losing the 
Brunet jUdgment convinced him of that. He complained bitter­
ly that enforcement of the law, especially against the 
American Fur Company. heaped unfair hardships upon the agent~ 
If something more effectual is not done to pro­
tect the officers of the Government against the 
Cupidity of the Traders. they will be reduced to the 
alternative of deciding between pecuniary ruin. on 
the on~6hand. and disobediance of orders on the 
other. j 
No doubts haunted Street on that point. however. "For my 
single self. I shall not begin in my age to place pecuniary 
means in opposition to the recognition of my country.n3? By 
1833. the scenario for a prolonged street-Company dispute 
was established. street's anti-Company prejUdice achieved 
mature proportions in 1833. Street wrote in October. 1832: 
Whether we are making Treaties, in which the
 
American Fur Company and its agents, are through
 
36Street to Cass, December 5, 1832; M234, Roll 728. 
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their connivance with the Indians drawing off 
large ~ums o~ money-Those ag~nts are by every 
means ln thelr power harrasslng the officers of 
the ~'S. on the frontier-striving to undermine 
the lnfluence of the Govt. & its agents with the 
Inds. and using their influence to subvert the 
voi?e~ ~nd :plans of the Gov. fQr the amelioration 
& Clvlllzatlon of the Indians.Jd 
Miners and traders were significant not so much in 
themselves, but rather for their influence upon Indian af­
fairs. Those individual groups and their intricate, com­
ponent parts, played an active an4noteworthy part in Indian 
relations. However, S*reet's involvement with basic Indian 
affairs consumed a large portion of his time and energies. 
Concern for all facets of Indian life enmeshed Street 
deeply in those relations. 
Street's correspondence relative to strictly Indian 
affairs began in November, 1827. At that time, street sug­
gested purchasing the Winnebago lead mining lands. street 
early revealed his personal estimation of himself as an out­
growth of the above-mentioned purchase. Street's strong be­
lief in his potential would later blossom into full-fledged 
egotism. After Street stated his opinions germane to the 
proposed land purchase, he added: "I confidently trust that 
the motives which impelled me to venture these remarks will 
be dUly appreciated. 1I39 In that same letter, street reported 
38Street to Clark, October 4, 1832; M234, Roll 728. 
39street to Barbour, November 15, 1827; M2J4, Roll 696. 
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approximately 900 to 1000 Winnebago warriors with the tribe, 
divided into three groups; one on the Rock River (which 
generally fell under Street's jurisdiction), another on the 
Fox River, and a third located north of Prairie du Chien on 
. . . . 40the Ml.ssl.ssl.PPl.. 
The Dodge confrontation impressed upon Street the 
necessity of Indian removal. street believed that white 
vices and low frontier morality presented poor examples for 
ignorant Indians. He advocated removal of the Winnebago in­
habiting lands east of the Mississippi to new lands across 
the river on its west bank. That plan, he argued, would 
benefit the Winnebago, while at the same time (as an added 
inducement), opening up increased tracts for white settle­
41ment. Because street realized that white occupancy of the 
region was inevitable, he sought to use that fact to his 
advantage to garner support for his plan. Street then pro­
posed that the United states buy a selected strip of land 
forty miles wide, running from the Mississippi River to the 
Des Moines River. One half would be acquired from the Sioux, 
the other half from the Sac and Fox. street envisioned 
Winnebago settled there acting as a human buffer between 
40street to Barbour, January 8, 1828; M234 , Roll 696. 
41Street to Eaton, February 22, 1830: M234, Roll 696. 
41 
Figure 3. Indian Land Cessions in Iowa, 1824-1851. 
Reprinted from Peterson, Ope cit., p. 145. 
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those constantly warring tribes,42 living in safety and pro­
tected by intermarriage with both. 4J Winnebago benefits 
would be substantial, he reasoned, on account of increased 
distance between the Winnebago and the whites. 44 Street in­
sisted the ,plan was one he had projected as early as the 
summer of 1828. At that time, the Winnebago had exhibited 
a real desire to sell their lands east of the Mississippi 
and south of the Wisconsin Rivers. By 18)0, circumstances 
had changed I 
Now, it was said, to be a hard matter to make a
 
purchase at all, and great credit is given to many
 
individuals who, to my knowledge'4had nothing bene­

ficial to the U.S. to do with it. 5
 
When the Congress consummated the purchase in 18)0, boun­
daries established clearly paralleled ones drawn by street 
two years earlier. His accuracy prompted him to remark un­
abashedly. "If this was guessing-it was pretty good guessing"; 
he was equally adamant in his determination that opposition 
to removal stemmed from whites who " ••• live and fatten on the 
poor Indians, and their portion of the annuity offers too 
great a temptation to pass_up.,,46 street had specific reference 
42Ida M. Street, "A Chapter of Indian History," Annals 
of Iowa, Third Series, III, (1897-1899), p. 602. 
4Jstreet to Eaton, February 22, 18)0; 00234, Roll 696. 
44street to Clark, February 27, 18)0; 1.\1234. Roll 728. 
· ­45Iblao 
4) 
to traders in the last remark. Removal weakened the trader's 
economic strangle hold on the Indians merely by increasing 
the physical distance between them. 
White antagonisms were not the only causes of dis­
ruption. Long-standing, inter-tribal hostilities also 
threatened frontier peace and tranquility. Street sensed an 
uneasy undercurrent in February, 1830, when he wrote: tiThe 
several tribes of Indians a~e quietly pursuing their hunts 
in this quarter; tho' I am induced to believe it is the 
breathless calm before the tornado. ,.47 Street believed war 
preparations were afoot among the Winnebago, Sioux, and 
Menominees for the following spring. He guessed their future 
target was the Sac and Fox tribe. street remarked to Clark 
in a letter of February 27, 1830, that only " ••• prompt 
intervention of the military arm of our Government" could 
prevent open warfare. 48 By October, 1830, Street saw an 
all-enveloping Indian war developing. Chippewa boldness 
seemed the most likely source to spark a general conflagra­
tion: "Latterly Big] the Chippewas have been darring LSigJ 
& saucey, and I am not without some apprehension that they 
will at last do some mischief. 1I49 
47street to Clark, February 27, 18)Or M234, Roll 728. 
49street to Clark, October 29. 18)0; M2)4, Roll 696. 
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Conditions remained surprisingly stable until the sum­
mer of 1831, when a party of Sac and Fox warriors fell upon 
an encampment of sleeping Menominees around Fort CraWford, 
murdering twenty-five of the forty Indians camped there. 
Retaliation for the raid was staved off by governmental 
promises; guilty warriors would be brought to justice and 
punished by United states' military forces. However, that 
promise was made as an expediency, and never fUlly complied 
50
with. The incident increased hatred for the Sac and Fox 
among other Indian tribes which erupted as an outgrowth of 
the Black Hawk War in 1832. 
Unrest spilled over into 1832. Black Hawk was a $ajor 
Sac and Fox war chief, renowned for his martial exploits. 
He was also known for the fairness and honesty he displayed 
in tribal matters. Enraged over white encroachments on 
tribal lands near Saukenauk, the Sac and Fox's traditional 
village located at the Mississippi and Rock River junction, 
and a disputed land cession negotiated by drunken Sac and 
Fox chiefs at St. Louis in 1804, Black Hawk and about 1000 
followers crossed to Saukenauk from the Mississippi's west 
bank. The village had been abandoned early in 1832, due to 
spreading white settlements near it. Determined to regain 
lost tribal lands, reoccupy Saukenauk, and expel white 
squatters, Black Hawk generated wild panic along the frontier. 
50street to Clark, August 1, 1831; M2J4, Roll 728. 
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Figure 4. Map of the Black Hawk War, 1832. 
Reprinted from Peterson, Opt cit., p. 128. 
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Governor John Reynolds of Illinois ordered 1400 militia to 
rendevous at Balnestown on the Illinois River to combat the 
hostile Sac and Fox. General Henry Atkinson wrote Street 
on April 25, 1832, that " ... the prospect of war brilghtens. 1I51 
Atkinson, the campaignts military leader, accurately assessed 
the importance of Street's position geographically and with 
respect to Winnebago encamped near Prairie du Chien. 
Atkinson added: "Inform me of anything of interest apper­
taining to your dept. Try & keep your Indians quiet. 1I52 
Street maintained close scrutiny over the Winnebago. 
He reported to Clark on August 1. 1832. that many Winnebago 
had come into Prairie du Chien at his request and " ••• en­
camped in front of my agency ••• completely under my eyes.,,53 
Street recruited Winnebago braves to intercept Sac and Fox 
bands which floated down the Wisconsin River in an attempt 
to reach and cross the Mississippi. 54 Winnebago reports to 
Street indicated Sac and Fox braves had hidden their women 
and children in a marshy area west of Winnebago Lake called 
the "Islands" for safety. The Islands was a high patch of 
prairie, fifteen or twenty acres in size, lying within an 
51Henry Atkinson to Street, April 25, 18)2; Letter­
book, p. 18. 
53Street to Clark, August 1. 18J2; M234, Roll 728. 
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impassable swamp. Approachable only by means of a narrow 
neck of land, the Sac and Fox mistakenly believed it afforded 
great protection. 55 Relentless pursuit by Atkinson's troops 
forced its abandonment. Scattered groups of Sac and Fox 
then sought safety by 1110ating down the Wisconsin. Street's 
Winnebago patrols intercepted a number of them, killing 
several and taking eight scalps. Prisoners taken consisted 
primarily of women and children. War's hardships upon the 
prisoners moved Street to write in August, 18J2; 
The prisoners are the most miserable looking
 
poor creatures you can imagine. Wasted to mere
 
skeletons, clothed in rags scarcely sUfficient to
 
hide their nakedness. Some of the children look
 
as if they had starved so long they could not be
 
restored.56
 
Whites feared a general Indian uprising, even though 
other tribes were unsympathetic to the Sac and Fox. Atkinson 
cautioned street to keep his Winnebago neutral; street suc­
ceeded admirably in that task. street attributed his success 
to forthright initiative, especially by his disbursement of 
increased food supplies to Winnebago allies. Congress later 
followed suit and authorized food distributions as inducements 
to guarantee Winnebago neutrality. Street related his ef­
forts in preserving that neutrality to Clark in July, 1832: 
I had for several months acted upon the prin­
ciples of that law, as a measure called for by the 
55street to Clark, June 7, 1832; M234, Roll 696. 
56street to Clark, August 1, 1832; 00234, Roll 728. 
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exigencies of th? case. Had I not assumed to do so, 
and extend~d my l.ssues beyond what ordinarily hadLheen7 thel.r usual amount, many of the Winnebagoes
of thl.s Agency, who have by my exertions and influ­
ence been kept from the seat of war, would have 
drawn to the section of country occupied by the Sac 
& Foxes, and possibly some of them d~awn into an 
hostile attitude against the whites." 
Street's self-esteem ballooned in a letter of August 27, 
1832, to Major General Winfield Scotti 
Anything you may desire to ask of the Winnebagoes 
that belong to my agency, will be done on my requisi­
tion through their chiefs •••You will perceive that 
und~r my 0rders and encouragements they have been8actl.ve.' 
The Black Hawk War ended in a matter of months. Pur­
sued at every turn, Black Hawk's band dwindled as food gave 
out and casualties mounted. In August, 1832, the decimated 
remnants of the original Sac and Fox band attempted to cross 
the Mississippi at the Bad /(xe River junction. Surprised by 
soldiers, they suffered even larger casualties. Of the 
original 1000 members of Black Hawk's band, only 150 sur­
vived the entire conflict; Black Hawk was among the survivors. 
Government expenditures totaled nearly $2,000,000 to elimin­
ate only 850 Indians. 59 Street reported Black Hawk's capture 
57Street to Clark, JUly 1), 18)2; Letterbook, p. 25· 
58street to Winfield Scott, August 22, 18)2; Andrew 
Jackson Papers (Library of Congress, Roll 41). 
59William J. Peterson, The Story of Iowa, I (New Yorkl 
Lewis Historical PUblishing Company, 1952;, pp. 130»131. 
on August 28, 18321 
I hasten to communicate to you that the cele­
bra~ed Sac chief Black Hawk, and the Prophet, were 
dell.vered to me yesterday by a party of Winnebagoes 
of my agency g8nt .out by me some tmme past in pur­
suit of them. 
Black Hawk's capture was welcome news in Washington. How­
ever, Street neglected to notify the War Department of the 
capture before he released the same information to several 
newspapers which publicized his role in the capture. War 
Department correspondence dated September 25, 1832, repri­
manded Street for his improper conduct in the matterl 
Your letter of the 28th ult', announcing brief­
ly the surrender of Black Hawk and the Prophet, was 
received this morning, four days after the pUblica­
tion in the Globe of your letter ••• The Department 
reminds you, that it is the duty of an Agent to make 
his earliest and most detailed communications to the 
government. 61 
Whether street's egotism was justified or not, especially as 
he viewed himself as instrumental in Black Hawk's capture, 
Street's actiYities throughout the entire conflict met the 
approbation of Atkinson. He wrote street on August 29, 18)21 
I take this occasion to say to you that your 
conduct as Indian agent has been highly satisfac­
tory to me and in all resP5~ts conformable to the 
interests of the U.States. 
60Street to Secretary of War, August 28, 18)2; M2J4, 
Roll 728. 
61 Robb to street. September 25. 18)2; M21. Roll 9. p. 
255· 
62Atkinson to street. August 29. 18)2; M2J4. Roll 697. 
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Treaty negotiations with the defeated Sac and Fox com­
menced in September, 1832. Final provisions of Black Hawk's 
Treaty required the Sac and Fox to agree to land cessions 
west of the Mississippi roughly equivalent to the eastern 
quarter of present-day Iowa, which forced them to move far­
63ther west. Street warned Clark in October, 1832, that the 
Black Hawk Treaty was a poor one. Street declared that 
Indian unrest still ran high. 
But let the U.S. b~ ware LSigl of liberating the 
ringleaders of the late disturbance untill LSi£? 
there is a more settled feeling among all the Indians64 
in this Quarter. The snake is "scotched-not killed." 
Nonetheless, Street's prediction proved inaccurate, 
and a substantial degree of peace was restored. Treaty nego­
tiations were begun with the Winnebago, also, and ratifica­
tion of that treaty followed on September 15, 1832. The 
Indians ceded lands east of the Mississippi and south of the 
Wisconsin Rivers to the United states. Completion of 
Winnebago removal to the strip of ground set aside for that 
purpose (called the Neutral Ground) was scheduled for June 1, 
1833. 6.5 
63charles J. Kappler (camp. and ed.), Indian Treaties 
1~78-188J (New Yorkl Interland Publishing, Inc., 1972), p. 
3 9· 
64Street to Clark, October 4, 1832; M234, Roll 728. 
65KapPler, Opt cit., pp. 345-346. 
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The Winnebago treaty provided for the establishment 
of a school for Winnebago children (or any Indian children 
of any tribe) who were to receive educationa>l instruction 
and mechanical training so that " ••• their hands should be 
66
educated. 11 street fervently believed that Indian education 
was on equal footing with removal as a means to rescue the 
Indians from ignorance and exploitation. Street's support 
of Indian education dated back to his arrival at Prairie du 
Chien. Thomas McKenney had echoed street's sentiment. In a 
letter to street written on April 13, 1830, !yicKenney urged 
Indian education which, " ••• once under way, the benefits 
will be apparent, and more will be sent, and at the Indians' 
will, clamor for an extension of the privilege.,,67 Staunch 
and unremitting opposition erupted from the American Fur 
Company. The Company feared Indian education would generate 
an increase in Indian agricultural settlements, prompt Indians 
to abandon their traditional, nomadic lifestyle in favor of 
a settled existence, and force Indian recognition of the 
1 " 1 68 Th C •sAmerican Fur Company's strang 1ng monopoy.e ompany 
influence, inadvertently supported by bureaucratic inefficiency 
66street, itA Chapter of Indian History, II Ope cit., p. 
606. 
67Thomas L. McKenney to Street, April 3D, 1830i M21, 
Roll 6, PP' 384-386. 
68Street, "Joseph Street's Last Fight with the Fur 
'rraders,lI Opt cit., p. 113· 
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and delay, prevented actual construction of the school from 
beginning until the following spring in 1834. 
Street's advocacy of removal revived near the end of 
18)2 in conjunction with Winnebago education. He believed 
vested interests such as the Company, motivated by selfish 
drives, strove to block removal in order to preserve their 
commercial primacy. American Fur Company pressure was 
" •••made to bear upon the U.S. Lt27 prevent 100. s for a time 
from migrating to the west if some countervailing measures 
are not taken.,,69 To facilitate removal, Street proposed dis­
pensing annuity payments west of the Mississippi, and aban­
donment of the Winnebago agency at the Fox-Wisconsin River 
portage. 70 Street wrote agent John Kinzie in November, 18)2, 
relating the substance of a letter to Clark. 
1 urged that the security and future peace of 
the country required that they remove west, and 
that the country was incapable of supporting those 
on it ••• and that difficulties would be inevitable, 
and that all our influence ought to be executed to 
induce them to go to the West. 71 
Of the American Fur Company, Street said. 
Mr. J. Rolette, Agent of the A.Fur Co ••• informed 
me that the Winnebagoes would not remove West •••He 
added that he would do all in his power to prevent 
them from going west of the Miss."72 
69street to Clark, October 7, 18)2; M2)4, Roll 728. 
7°1·.b..lao,
71 street, "A Chapter of Indian History," op. cit., 
p. 608. 
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By 1833, street had assumed firm control of his 
agency. Basic issues became apparent which set the tone for 
his subsequent years as agent. Within the overall context 
of Indian affairs, American Fur Company machinations, Indian 
education, removal, and white encroachments, all jelled to 
form an active matrix around which street oentered his 
official duties. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRAIRIE DU CHIEN, 1833-1834 
Street's final two years at Prairie du Chien wit­
nessed a continuation of the primary issues which had 
occupied his attention during the 1827-1832 period. White 
encroachments on supposedly sovereign Indian lands, Indian 
education, and most importantly, Indian removal, remained 
Street's main areas af interest. A certain portion of each 
issue was contained within a formal complaint lodged against 
Street in December, 1833, by Hercules Dousman, the American 
Fur Company's general agent, and partner of Joseph Rolette. 
Dousman accused Street of misappropriation of funds and con­
flict of interest. Dousman's charges imbued the period 183J 
to1834 with a cohesive framework, graphically drawing each 
basic issue with which Street dealt. Moreover, the charges 
outlined a pattern of activity and opposing forces which 
directly affected the balance of street's tenure as an 
Indian agent. 
In January, 1833, street faced another sensitive 
problem involving whites. Swelling numbers of white set­
tlers had entered Indian country, some of which lay on the 
Mississippi's east bank, but primarily on the west bank. 
Those lands were ceded (september, 18J2) by Black Hawk, but 
still legally inhabited by the Sac and Fox. Street notified 
the War DeDartment of the situation and received this reply:~ -
55 
••• in the case of intruders, their expulsion from 
the Indian Country is a rule, not to be deviated 
from on any consideration, whatever the pretense 
~ be,.or under the color of whatever alledgedLSiV rlght. A strict and firm conformity to 
those principles is demanded of those on whom de­
volves the duty of carrying them into effect.1 
street received permission to remove the trespassers and he 
solicited assistance from Colonel Zachary Taylor at Fort 
Crawford. Some of the intruders had already left, advised 
to do so by the Indian agent at Rock Island. 2 Street found 
expulsion of white trespassers a touchy, explosive issue; he 
believed that illegal settlers would not vacate the region 
quietly.) SUbstantial white settlement, protected by white 
antipathy to Indian territorial sovereignty and the agent's 
weak coercive powers,. grew on, and near, Indian lands. A 
War Department communication reminded street on March 29, 
18)) • 
••• that you are empowered as Indian agent to call 
upon the commanding officer at Prairie du Chien or 
Rock Island for such a military force as may be 
lElbert Herring to Joseph street, January 14, 18J). 
Bureau of Indian Affairs: Letters Sent, 1824-1881. National 
Archives, Record Group 75: Series M21, Roll 9, p. 490. 
(Hereinafter referred to as M21.) 
2Joseph street to Zachary Taylor, February 16, 18J3; 
Bureau of Indian Affairs: Letters Received, 1824-1881; 
National Archives, Record Group 75; Series M2)4, Roll 696. 
(Hereinafter referred to as M2J4.) 
3street to Herring, March 6, 1833; M234, Roll 696. 
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sufficient to expel and keep off intruders from
 
lands lately ceded to the United States by the
 
Sac and Fox Indians. q
 
Street elected to allow Indian land claims to expire, rather 
than force a confrontation. Sac and Fox claims expired on 
June 1, 1833. street's discretion in the potentially ex­
plosive situation was an expediency justified by his desire 
to preserve peace and promote removal without acrimonious 
bickerings. 
Street's reluctance to expel the intruders reinforced 
his faith in removal. Street saw education as the Indian's 
sole rescuer. Elbert Herring, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs from JUly 10, 18)2 to July 4, 1836, agreed that 
1I ••• the benefits derivable from that source will be gradual 
but they are infallible. IIS American Fur Company opposition 
seemed the likeliest source of obstruct Indian progress 
through education. As street put ita 
The success of these measures, the education of 
the Indian mind and the Indian character, rescues 
them from the rapacious hands of the traders, and 
the heartless speculation, and clothesthem with an 
independence unknown in their wild, ungoverned state. 
Though free to roam as they list, Indians in the 
vicinity of whites, and in awe of their power are 
the mere slaves of the unprincipled white popUlation 
engaged in the Indian Trade. From this thraldom it 
4Herring to street, march 29, 1833; M21, Roll la, 
p. 164. 
'Herring to street, March 5, 1833; M21, Roll 10, 
pp. 93-94. 
5? 
is the duty as it is to the interest of the
 
Governmegt of the United States to liberate the
 
Indians. 
Although Street endeavored to stimulate Winnebago education, 
operating through 1832 treaty provisions which set aside 
$7500 for that purpose, his signal efforts occurred after 
18)4 and his transfer to Rock Island. 
Indian removal became Street's primary interest. 
street's official correspondence resounded with declarations 
on all removal aspects. Elbert Herring wrote street in 
March, 1833, that removal was essential, " ••• being likely to 
promote their own welfare and the interests of the white 
citizens."? Herring wrote Street the following month, de­
claring his conviction that Indian removal was mandatory: 
"The measure is imperatively demanded, by considerations 
growing out of their own interest and the safety of our own 
citizens, and will be enforced. IIS street realized successful 
completion of the project was hindered by American Fur 
Company oppositionc 
.•• the agent of the American Fur Company here,
 
would exer.t all.the materials he could.o£pira~e
 
LSi£? upon, to prevent the removeal LSl£/ as lt
 
6Ida M. Street, "A Chapter of Indian History," Annals 
of Iowa, Third Series, III, (1897-1899), p. 612. 
7Herring to Street, March 5, 183); M21, Roll 10, pp. 
93-94. 
8Herring to street, April 6, 1833; M21, Roll 10, p. 
108. 
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would interfere. wi th the Fur Trade ••• The inter­
preter at Fort Winnebago is in the pay of the Fur 
Company and ••• is exerting his influence to induce 
these Indians to make villages on the Wiskonsin 
fBi£! below and near the Portage. 9 
street believed his influence over the Winnebago was potent 
enough in itself to secure their removal. 
And my Indians are not in the habit of making 
any demands of me. An intercourse established in 
confidence. and continued in deep affection, has 
no recourse to such measures. For the events of 
the last year must have convinced the most skeptical, 
that there is an influence exerted at this agency, 
over the Indians for the benefit alike of the United 
states and the Indian. 10 
Time and again. street ralled against American Fur Company 
intransigence to removal and its favorable outgrowths. He 
asked. 
Is it reasonable to suppose the Department will 
advise the entire abandoament in this Quarter, of 
these great and inter[esJting objects? Can they con­
sent to the sacrifice of half a nation of Indians, to 
glut the cupidity of a few white men?11 
Street declared his interest rested upon unselfish motivesl 
til have no personal or pecuniary interest in this matter 
apart from a deep sense of responsibility as a man and 
officer. u12 Less commendable motives sparked the Company to 
desire retention of the Viinnebago east of the Mississippi. 
The Company wanted the Winnebago under its control, easily 
9street to Clark. June 24, 18)31 M234, Roll 728. 
1110 Ibid.Ibid .. 
12Ibid • 
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accessible, in order to oversee the Indian trade. 13 The 
Company brought direct pressure to bear to hinder Winnebago 
removal. Herring informed Street that u ••• the conduct of 
Mr. Rolette ••• in endeavoring to dissuade them from removing 
to the West is highly reprehensible. u14 
By August, 1833, Winnebago removal had begun. Several 
bands, pressured by increasingly scarce supplies of game, 
chose to move rather than starve. street reported several 
hundred had moved. Those who had crossed the Mississippi 
missed part of their annuity payment. Annuities, paid in 
food and cash, were authorized by treaty stipulations and 
acted as an encouragement for western removal. Street argued 
in a letter to Clark in August, 1833, that annuities paid at 
Prairie du Chien, rather than the Fox-Wisconsin Portage, 
would lure the Indians westward. Street reasoned that re­
moval was more easily implemented at Prairie du Chien. 15 
He disagreed with War Department claims, relative to opinions 
expressed by Michigan Territorial Governor Peter Porter, that 
Winnebago annuities were too large-Street insisted they were 
too small. 16 Street's criticism of annuity payment procedures 
l)street to Clark, June 24, 1833: M234, Roll 728. 
14Herring to street, July 1), 183); M21, Roll 11, p. 46. 
15street to Herring, August 1, 1833: 00234, Roll 696. 
16CasB to Street, August 9, 1833; 0021, Roll 11, PP' 
104-106. 
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threatened American Fur Company involvement in trading at 
those payments. Street sensed his unrelenting condemnation 
of the Company made him a likely target for retribution, a 
prediction borne out by later events. 1? 
Street did not enjoy the complete confidence or sup­
port of Secretary of War Casso Street's friendship with one 
Major Thomas Biddle sparked hostilities between street and 
Casso Biddle wrote highly critical, anonymous newspaper 
accounts of Cass' Indian treaty negotiations, lacing those 
accounts with derrogatory personal remarks. Initially, Gass 
believed Street to be the articles' author. Eventually, he 
discovered Biddle's involvement and forgave him, but retained 
1S 
an antipathy to Street that was unwarranted, but potent.
Interestingly, Cass had asked President Andrew Jackson to 
remove Street from office in 1833, ostensibly because Street 
was a Whig, and not a Jackson Democrat. Jackson refused to 
remove street, saying. "I know General street is a Whig, but 
he is an honest man and as long as I am president, he shall 
be Indian agent.,,19 Jackson's favorable attitude towards 
17Cass to street, August 9, 1833: M21, Roll 11, pp. 
104-106. 
18street to Montfort Stokes, August 26, 1833: Joseph 
Montfort Street Letterbook, held by the Iowa State Depart­
ment of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa, p. 33· 
(Hereinafter referred to as Letterbook.) 
19Ida IV;. Street, "Joseph Street's Last Fight with the 
Fur Traders," Annals of Iowa, Third Series, XVII (1929), 0. 
131 • 
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street was based upon his earlier association with Street 
while riding the judicial circuit years before in Tennessee 
while street was reading law under Henry Clay. street fur­
ther suspected Cass' close, protege-type relationship to 
Judge James Doty who heard the Brunet case. Overt actions 
taken against Street were cloudy, but Cass did manage to 
keep street's life unsettled by an unwanted agency shift in 
18J4. street viewed that move as representative of deeper 
motivations, motivations he suspected were leveled directly 
against himself. 
Finding me constantly exerting my influence to 
civilize and reclaim the Indians from the Iron 
bondage of ignorance which they have them, the agent 
at this place and his traders are doing all they can 
to endeavor to get me removed. What steps they may 
take-I do not know, but I am told by a friend that 
they are endeavoring ••• to work upon C~as in such a 
way as to get me removed if possible. 
By 1836, street was completely convinced that his initial 
suspicions of Cass were well-grounded; street's transfer to 
Rock Island in September, 18)4, which he bitterly opposed, 
put to rest any remaining doubts. street's efforts to induce 
Cass to rescind the transfer took Street to Washington in the 
summer of 1834. Cass' refusal to meet Street caused him to 
remark bitterly to subagent Thomas p. Burnett (at Prairie du 
. ,,21Chien) that" •••Cass is sllppery. 
20street to Stokes, August 26, 18)); Letterbook, p. 33· 
21 street , "Joseph street's Last Fight ',.Ji th the Fur 
Traders," loco cit. 
. 
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The chief opponent of removal was the American Fur 
Company. Indubitably, street looked upon that enterprise as 
the frontier's most anti-Indian establishment. Street con­
stantly spoke out against Company schemes. 
Every attempt to civilize Indians in this sec­

tion is violently opposed by the agent of the
 
American F'ur Company and all their traders. They
 
live on the savages ignorance and brutality of the
 
Inds. and lead him into the most debasing immoral­

ity and they strive to keep them ignorant savages

and brutally ignorant. 22
 
By June of 18J4, street's removal concepts had crys­
talized. Removal, by Street's thinking, was necessary for 
several reasons. Expanded white settlements on the fringe 
of Indian lands grew increasingly important. Removal would 
also tend to complicate the whiskey peddler's labors in 
selling "ardent spirits" in undeveloped areas west of the 
Mississippi. Last. in a very practical sense, the cost of 
removal remained far less than that of a resultant Indian 
war which Street felt was imminent if the Winnebago continued 
. . . . 2) St t k d to inhabit lands east of the M1SS1SSlppl. ree remar e 
in a blanket statement of removal that " •••It is demanded by 
the best interests of the Wlnnebagoes that they go West and 
forever.'1 24 Street believed the whiskey sellers wielded 
22street to stokes, August 26, 1833; Letterbook, p. 33· 
2 treet to Herring, June 4, 18)4; M2)4, Roll 697· 
24~b'd]. •1. 
p 
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great power over the Indians. Traders offered up a serious, 
entrenched obstacle to removal: 
•• •everything within the power and control of the 
Department ~hould be so disposed and used, as to 
save these ~gnorant savages from the devastating 
tide of ~iquid fire that a remorseless band of cold, 
calculat~ng.heartless Traders are pouring into th.;ir 
country to maden /.Sii/, blind, and deceive them. 2 ) 
Indians decried both whiskey selling and white encroachments. 
Keokuk, an important Sac chief, protested white designs on 
Indian lands, arguing that whites were unsatisfied with lands 
ceded by the 18)2 Black Hawk Treaty. Keokuk claimed covet­
ous white men eyed Sac and Fox territory on the Mississippi's 
h kukban,k 0 en 0 . a so. ~eo··west 1nt tOtupon m1gra lng tere, I 26 K sug­
gested to Street that his tribe be allowed to remove even 
farther west. The Des Moines River area impressed Keokuk as 
an acceptable, permanent location, and Street relayed the 
information and Keokuk's request for removal to Clark in 
August, 18)4. 27 (The establishment of a new Sac and Fox 
agency on the Des Moines in 1838, with Street as its agent, 
eventually fulfilled Keokuk's request.) Keokuk hoped for War 
Department approval of his request, since Indian proximity 
to whites created serious problems as the Indians easily 
, hOtsecured Whiskey and would often H ••• do mischief to the W11 es. 
25street to Herring, June 4, 1834 ; M234, Roll 697. 
26 t t Cl k August 19 l Hv )4· M'J2J4, Roll 729·Stree 0 ar.,·." .", I 
') S" ~". Ibid. 
11 
28 
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Winnebago removal plans suffered a serious setback in 
the late summer of 1834. Congress hastily passed an act which 
called for the reorganization of all Indian agencies in the 
Michigan Territory. Street was directly affected. The Sac 
and Fox agency at Rock Island was transferred to Green Bay. 
and its Indians and their lands were transferred to the 
Prairie du Chien agency; the responsibility for all those 
Indians at Prairie du Chien fell on Street. Unfortunately. 
he was transferred to Rock Island to oversee operations of 
the new consolidated agency.29 Street hotly protested the 
transfer. He cited American Fur Company pressure and trader 
self-interests. intent upon retaining the established fea­
tures of the profitable fur trade. as blamable for street's 
unwanted and untimely transfer. Street said; 
Unable to affect me in any way where we are 
alike known, their savage vengence has pursued me 
into your office-and had they the power not only 
denunciation but pros~Eiption and banishment would 
be inflicted upon me. J 
street responded to his transfer with a counter­
proposal. street proposed transferring the Rock Island 
agency to Green Bay. but would assign all Sac, Fox. and 
Winnebago Indians to Prairie du Chien. Street's proposals 
made Prairie du Chien rather than Rock Island the principal 
29street, "Joseph street's Last Fight with the Fur 
rrraders," pp. 121-122. 
. -,JOlb lao 
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agency.,31 Advantageous from his own position, Streetls plan 
allowed firm control of Indian affairs from Prairie du Chien, 
provided more pupils for the Winnebago school (which was then 
under construction), and eliminated the necessity for Street 
to maintain two residences, one at Prairie du Chien and the 
other at Rock Island. J2 
Street's proposal availed him nothing. He wrote 
Cass from Rock Island on September 12, 1834, requesting per­
mission to return to Prairie du Chien. Street remained at 
Rock Island until October 28. 1834, when the War Department 
allowed him to return to Prairie du Chien until April 1, 
1835. At that time, his permanent assignment to Rock 
Island was scheduled to begin.)) Street did not repair to 
Rock Island without additional protestation. His letter of 
September 12, 18)4, painted a dreary picture of conditions 
at Rock Island-irreparable agency buildings and the presence 
of few Indians caused Street to conclude that If •••no pUblic 
or private benefit will be attained by the presence of an 
Indian Agent at Rock Islando lf34 On a personal basis, street 
bemoaned the forced separation from his family (who remained 
31Street. "Joseph street1s Last Fight with the Fur 
Traders," pp. 121-122. 
33Kurtz to street. October 28, 1834; M21, Roll 14, p. 
104. 
34street to Cass, September 12, 1834; M2J4 1 Rall 697· 
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at Prairie du Chien) and friends, as well as the loss of 
"preached religion. 1l35 
street discounted Rock Island's advantages as an 
Indian agency. Zachary Taylor, street's close friend and a 
prominent figure in frontier affairs, concurred. Taylor up­
held street's contention that the agency was most advantag­
eously located at Prairie du Chien. Taylor argued that the 
area of eastern Iowa was rapidly filling with whites, making 
Indian travel to Prairie du Chien possible without travers­
ing white-held lands, a feat impossible at Rock Island; Winne­
bago bands would preserve clear communications if Prairie du 
Chien were retained as the agency location. 36 Taylor be­
lieved Prairie du Chien straddled a crucial junction in 
frontier Indian movements due to navigable rivers like the 
Mississippi, Wisconsin, and the Fox, each serving as a "great 
thoroughfare. ,,37 Taylor added. lIlt therefore appears to me 
that a resident agent could do more good here than at any 
other place on the upper lViississippi. u38 street wholeheart­
edly agreed with Taylor's assessment, but the sway of their 
arguments was not convincing enough to alter street's 
35street to Cass, september 12, 18)4: M23~, Roll 697· 
36Taylor to street, September 6, 1834 : Letterbook, 
p. 44. 
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transfer, and he went to Rock Island. 
Resigned to his transfer, street quickly formulated a 
policy to manage Sac and Fox bands " •••who have been greatly 
agitated by the events of the past few years. 1I39 The Sac and 
Fox	 desired a new agency located farther west on the Des 
Moines River, and they expressed a willingness to concede 
certain parcels of land in eastern Iowa to guarantee an 
agency shift to the Des Moines. street supported the plan. 
I would with great deference, respectfully sug­
gest, the necessity of early adopting the following 
measures as best calculated to secure the peace of 
the frontier, and advance the improvement and civil­
ization of the Indians-To wit­
1.	 "The purchase at an early day in the ensuing 
spring of the Indian reservation on the Ioway 
River. 
2.	 • •• the selection of a proper place on the Des 
Moines and the erection of agency buildings ••• 
and 
3••••establishment of an ag~ncy for the Sac & 
Faxes on the Des Moines."~O 
street attached great importance to those proposals. He stated 
that any and all possible measures should be undertaken to 
remove the Indians. The creeping tide of white settlement 
would be offset by strategically locating agencies	 so Indians 
41 
were not forced to cross white lands to reach them. 
Ironically, Street's adamant support for Indian re­
moval suffered a setback on account of his transfer to Rock 
J9street to Clark, september 12, 1834; M2J4, Roll 729· 
41-1 b· . d1 •40Ibid • 
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Island. Agency details and moving difficulties during the 
last four months of 18)4 restricted him from actively pur­
suing tangible removal reSUlts. In Street's mind, there 
existed not the smallest particle of doubt that American Fur 
Company influence, venting itself through Cass in Washington, 
instigated his much-protested transfer to Rock Island. 
Company opposition to Street found a more visible form in 
allegations leveled at Street by Hercules Dousman in 
December, 1833· Dousman charged Street with fraud and con­
flict of interest. Subtle attacks on Street were replaced 
by a concerted effort to remove him. Examination of the 
Dousman charges, their development, and final disposition 
detail a fascinating period of Street's tenure. 
In December, 1833, Hercules Dousman brought serious 
charges against street, stating street's official conduct 
n ••• to have been anything but such as became an upright 
. h . t' 1,42Agent & the character he puts forth of be1.ng a C r1.S 1.an. 
Dousman claimed that street had paid an insufficient salary 
to interpreter Anable Grignon for services rendered (al­
though SUfficient funds had been appropriated by Congress 
. 4) Afr'for those services), and pocketed the d1.fference. 1.­
davits supported Dousman's charges, the testimonies being 
42Hercules Dousman to Herring, December 4, 1833; 
M234, Roll 696. 
43Ibid • 
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statements by Anable Grignon himself, Joseph Rolette (a 
Company trader), James Lockwood (a merchant), and Louis 
Menard. Grignon and Menard acted as interpreters in Indian 
dealings with the government. Dousman alleged that both 
made their mark on vouchers acknOWledging payment for their 
services, although neither could read or write, and was un­
able to ascertain exactly the amount for which he had signed. 
Grignon was paid only $20 per month, almost $15 per month 
less than street asserted that he paid out. Menard stated 
that he received no money whatsoever. 44 Dousman couched his 
charges in the "public good", stating " ••• the object of the 
vouchers to have been to defraud the United States out of the 
said sum of money. ,.4s James Lockwood, who signed one of the 
affidavits, further charged that Street had defrauded him of 
$100 worth of goods which Street had purchased from Lockwood 
on credit. street allegedly failed to settle with Lockwood, 
although he had been instructed to pay the claim by the War 
Department. Besides the claims of fraud, Dousman maintained 
that Street, in partnership with his son Thomas P. Street, 
operated a trading post which undercut local merchants. 
however, Dousman qualified his accusation by addingl 
44Hercules Dousman to Herring, December 4, 1833; 
M2 34. Hall 696. 
45 .. , • d'1 OJ.. • 
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It. is il!lpossible ~o know if Gen'l. Street is 
con?erned ln trade wlth his son, but it is the 
b~llef of all pers?ns concerned here that he fur­
nlshes a4~ the capltal & is the principle [SiiJ
partner. 
street responded in typical fashion. He wrote Clark 
on February 9, 1834, denouncing the Company. However, Street 
allowed that the charges were not unexpected in light of his 
support of removal, Indian education, and his general opposi­
tion to American Fur Company designsl liThe course taken, 
has been some time threatened, unless I conform to the views 
of Mr. Rolette and his creatures, and surrender the Indians 
of my agency to them .,,47 Street fel t Company wealth gener­
ated great power which was used to advance Company ends at 
gion, building huge monopoly in the process. The Company 
the expense of the Indians. The Company had either brought 
out or forced out of business every other trader in the re­
48 
a 
became Street's most formidable foe because he obstructed 
the unlimited use of that power. 
Official reaction completely upheld Street. Clark 
informed the War Department in February, 1834, that street's 
payment of the Lockwood claim (in 1831) was official, con­
formed to established procedures, and from all available evi­
dence, was paid in October, 1831. Any evidence presented to 
1\1234, 
46Hercules Dousman 
Roll 696. 
to Herring, December 4, 1833: 
47street to Clark, February 9, 1834; M2J4, Roll 697· 
48Ibid • 
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the contrary was suspect, Clark contended, addingl "I would 
place but little confidence in the statement of Joseph 
Rolette against any officer of the Government.,,49 Reaction 
from an unofficial source came unexpectedly from Shawneetown, 
Illinois, where Street had lived from 1812 to 1827, prior to 
his appointment as an Indian agent. Sixty of the town's 
citizens signed an affidavit which attested to Street's up­
right character. The affidavit stated that street had lived 
among them for many years and was " ••• repeatedly honored with 
the confidence of the people ••• he had uniformly sustained a 
character of the most unimpeachable integrity.IIS0 
street traveled to Washington to present his defence 
of the charges. In July, 1834, he presented personal affi­
davits of his own, sworn before justices of the peace in 
1t1iashington, in which he denied any involvement with his son's 
mercantile business at Prairie du Chien. 51 Street stated 
that he had faithfully paid Lockwood's $100 claim as well as 
equitably reimbursed all interpreters. 52 
49Clark to Herring, February 3, 18)4; M234, Roll 697· 
50Shawneetown to Cass, February 25, 18)4; 00234, Roll 
51Affidavit, District of Columbia, July 16, 1834; 
M234, Roll 697. 
52Affidavit, District of Columbia, July 17, 1834; 
M234, Roll 697. 
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strong endorsements of street's character and the per­
formance of his duties as an Indian agent came from other 
sources. Governor John Reynolds of Illinois wrote Cass in 
early March, 1834,. praising Streetl 
I have been intimately acquainted with Gen'l 
street for many years and know him to be a very 
talented gentleman and excellent moral character ••• 
I ~ow nothing of the particular charges preferred 
agalnst Gen'l Streetl but judging from his general 
character, and from the influence he has over said 
Indians which has been exercised to the advantage 
of all I am satisfied his contlnuance in office 
would advance the public good.)] 
Zachary Taylor wrote street in April, 1834, referring to 
Dousman's charges. Taylor, a faithful Street supporter, ex­
claimed that the charges were untrue. Taylor thought that 
the American Fur Company's opposition to Street's Indian 
improvement efforts was the actual stimulus for the charges. 
He added (in defense of Street's character): 
Having known you personally for more than a 
Quarter of a century, during which time you have 
uniformly maintained a high character for moral­
ity, honesty, & integrity, as well as on all occa­
sions a correct and gentlemanly deportment, & hav­
ing constantly witnessed your devotion & untiring 
exertions since I have been stationed at this place 
to imprQ~e the condition of the Indians of your 
agency • ...­
Taylor believed Company hostility to street initially hatched 
the entire scheme. The affidavits submitted by Dousman were 
5]Reynolds to Cass, March 6, 1834; M234 , Roll 697· 
54Taylor to street, April 15, 1834; M234, Roll 697· 
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signed by four men of "doubtful character 'l , two of whom,. 
Menard and Grignon, were illiterate and completely ignorant 
of the entire affair. And the other two, Rolette and Lock­
wood, Taylor postulated: " •••1 know to be personally hostile 
to you Ling? would stop at nothing to effect your removal 
from office, or impair your standing with the Offices of 
the Govern·me·nt .1155 Taylor l' pu 0 ett'e s h t er,d R I m gne· carac 
much as Clark had donel IIRolette ••• is not only notorious 
for vending whiskey to the Indians & keeping them constantly 
drunk ••• but for violating the law ••• by introducing into 
their country ardent spirits. u56 
Street made his official reply to the charges on 
May 28, 18]4. In a letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Elbert Herring, street vehemently condemned the American Fur 
Company and its agents, and strenuously protested his inno­
cence of all charges. street's denial left little to the 
imagination; he labeled the four men who signed affidavits 
supporting the charges made against him as an agent of the 
American Fur Company (Rolette), a trader and whiskey-seller 
(Lockwood), a drunken II half-Indian" (Grignon), and a "trif­
ling half-Negroes or mulatto", referring to Menard)? Their 
55Taylor to Street, April 15, 1834; M2J4, Roll 697· 
56Ibid •
 
57Street to Herring, May 28, 1834; M234, Roll 697·
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testimony, Street contended, was poor evidence because of 
their unsavory characters and contradictions in their ac­
counts and receipts. street fumed about the attempt to dis­
credit him. He wasl 
Opposed by an organized body of unprincipled
 
men,.with the almost unlimited resources of the
 
Amerlcan Fur Co. to back them, with fit materials
 
for evegy species of fraUd & corruption in their
 power. 5
And those allied against him were • 
••• an unprincipled set of traders who they knew 
were opposing every effort made by the Department 
for the benefit of the Indians, & were now har­
rassing officers of the Government by vexatious 
lawsuits; I have drawn upon my head the most deter­
mined resentment of these men. 59 
Street denied that he distributed Indian provisions at Prairie 
du Chien to generate business for his son Thomas' commercial 
enterprise I 
••• this would not have met the views of the Traders 
who were making a rich harvest in the transportation 
at high rates of these provisions from one place in 
the Indian Country to another place in the Indian 
country.bO 
Street reasoned that the traders desired to prevent the west­
ward removal of the Indians living east of the Mississippi 
to exploit them commercially. Disregarding the intense bar­
rage of criticism he endured, street steadfastly maintained 
58Street to Herring, May 28, 1834; M2J4, Roll 697· 
.59Ibid • 
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that his viability and effectiveness as an agent were unim­
paired. Street said the charges were made " ••• with the direct 
intention of drawing off my efforts from the Indians to de­
: fe·nd myself ... 61 As for h;s d f '1 t. . ~ supposeaJ. ure 0 pay the 
r 
interpreters, Street claimed Grignon, II •••who is drunken 
and worthless and used from necessity" was employed merely 
because nobody else could be found. 62 street insisted that 
Lockwood was paid: Lockwood's motives were seriously ques­
tioned by street for his participation in Dousman's charges~ 
And why has it quietly reposed in his bosom 
near two and a half years? And now has been secreted 
extracted Qy and before the agents of the American 
Fur Company at Prairie du Chien, at a time when the 
success of their plans in retaining the Winnebagoes 
on the Wiskonsin LSiQ7, depend on getting me removed, 
or denuded in the gQnfidence previously reposed in me 
by the Government? j 
street reserved violent condemnation for Rolette, inferring 
that Rolette was the prime mover behind the accusations 
leveled against streett t1Notorious as a common liar, I 
could not hope to get the truth if he had sworn, yet has 
not ... 64 
A War Department investigation of Dousman's charges 
exonerated Street. Herring informed street on July 16, 1834: 
After a careful examination of the affidavits 
and papers touching the char~es of official ma~c?n­
duct preferred against you, It affords me gra~J.flca­
tion to assure you, that the Department percelves 
61street to Herring, May 28, 1834; M234,	 Roll 697· 
64 , . ,63 Ib · ,	 1 DICi.10.. 
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conJ.ldence, and that you will therefore be
 
continu~d in t~e servi.ce gi the Government as
 
one of 1. ts Ind1.an Agents. 5 
The investigation completely disallowed the Lockwood claim, 
owing to street's record of accouhts and the testimony of 
other local merchants who vouched for Street's punctual pay­
ment of debts, most of which were sUbstantially larger than 
Lockwood's $100 claim. From Street's financial records and 
vouchers, it was ascertained that while he combined payment 
for more than one interpreter on his quarterly reports to 
the viar Department, the practice was irregular but not ille­
gal. The War Department ordered street to discontinue the 
practice as a means to simplify his accounts. Street's ex­
planation of that point was accepted and the Department 
granted that he had disbursed all funds appropriated to his 
agency. Last, the investigation disallowed the charge that 
street had engaged in a business with his son Thomas. Street 
admitted that Thomas kept a store in the agency house for a 
short duration ( six months) while a structure was under con­
struction to house his enterprise, but maintained that no 
conflict of interest existed. Street charged his son Thomas 
$100 per month for the privilege of keeping a store in the 
agency house, an amount which Joseph Street duly accounted 
for and applied to the rent of the agency buildings to hold 
65Herring to street, July 16, 1834; M21, Roll 13, pp. 
202-203. 
I p ~.. 
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government expenses down, an explanation viewed with approv­
al by the expense-conscious War Department. 66 
Street acted to aid the Winnebago, notably through 
removal, throughout 1833 and 1834. His endeavors threw him 
into acrimonious conflict with the American Fur Company and 
its myriad of interests. The Company strove to break the 
stalemate by accomplishing Street·s removal from office by 
charges based on feeble evidence, all of which Street suc­
cessfully refuted. Overwhelming proof and outside support 
from a variety of sources gave support so potent that the 
Company sought a more direct avenue to rid itself of trouble­
some street. Company influence exerted in Washington and the 
government during a reorganizational period of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs resulted in street·s transfer to Rock 
Island late in the summer of 1834. His ardent protests 
availed him nothing, and the following spring found street 
about to begin his duties at a new agency, Rock Island. 
66Herring to Dousman, July 19. 18]4; M21, Roll 1], 
pp. 220-2;~2. 
ROCK ISLAND, 1835-18)7 
Over Street's protests, Commissioner of Indian Af­
fairs Elbert Herring ordered Street to return to Rock Island 
on March 5, 1835. Street took up the agent's duties there 
on April 1, 1835. 1 He retained responsibility for the 
Indians inhabiting the region around Prairie du Chien, al­
though Rock Island became his permanent agency location. 
Street soon found that management of affairs at Prairie du 
Chien was complicated and difficult while he was stationed 
at Rock Island. The Winnebago school, authorized by treaty 
provisions of September, 1832, was one endeavor Street found 
himself unable to adequately supervise. He ardently held 
education to be the Indian's salvation from a nomadic life; 
so the discovery that he would not be in a position to over­
see the vital workings of the school distressed Street. The 
school's construction was delayed a full year, until the 
spring of 18)4, by a governmental policy dispute over its 
proposed location. Initial orders called for construction 
west of the Mississippi, but the order was countermanded by 
Secretary of War Lewis Cass in 183J, and construction slated 
1Elbert Herring to Joseph Street, March), 1~J5! 
Bureau of Indian Affairs; Letters Sent, 1824-1881; Natlonal 
Archives, Record Group 75: Series M21, Roll 15, p. 124. 
(Hereinafter referred to as M21.) 
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east of the Mississippi. Cass' order was eventually re­
scinded, and the final location of the school made west of 
the river. The dispute consumed an entire year, with one 
full building season lost through the confusion. 2 Construc­
tion began in the spring of 1834, and completed in the fall 
of that same year. situated on the Yellow River six miles 
above its confluence with the Mississippi, the school con­
sisted of a frame building built on a small, rich prairie 
ideally suited for the school's accompanying farm. 
Street had received his transfer orders to Rock 
Island shortly after contracts were let for the school's con­
struction in the spring of 18]4. He protested bitterly, 
arguing that few Indians inhabited the area adjacent to Rock 
Island. (The Black Hawk Treaty of 1832 inclUded Sac and Fox 
land cessions which removed them from the Rock Island area.) 
But more important, Fort Crawford's commanding officer was 
assigned the unwelcome task of school overseer. Since com­
mand frequently changed, a military officer found it im­
possible to grasp the reins of the school's operation over a 
short period of time. street argued fruitlessly that the 
commander had not the time nor inclination to involve him­
., 4 
self in non-military matters like school supervlslon. 
2Bruce E. Mahan. OldFort Crawfordand the Frontier 
(Iowa City. state Historical Society of Iowa, 1926), p. 201. 
4Ibid ., pp. 202-203· 
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However, all of street t s protests and reasonings went un­
heeded, the transfer stood, and Street reluctantly moved to 
Rock Island. 
In October, 1834, Reverend David Lowry, a Presbyterian 
minister from Tennessee, was appointed the school's teacher 
by President Andrew Jackson at an annual salary of $.500 •.5 
Wi th Lowry's wife Mary Ann serving as his assistant, Lowry 
opened the school early in 183.5. A heated controversy em­
broiled the school almost immediately. One Father Samuel 
Charles Mazzuchelli, an Italian Dominican priest, protested 
the school's operation in May, 1835.6 Mazzuchelli had 
served the Church for over thirty years in the areas of 
Wisconsin, Illinois, northern Michigan, and Iowa. He had 
applied for the Winnebago teacher's position in 1833 to 
Michigan Territorial Governor George B. Porter, but Lowry 
gained the appointment. Mazzuchelli insisted the school be 
placed under the Catholic Church's auspices, with Catholic 
religious instruction an integral part of the curriculum.? 
Mazzuchelli's resentment at being refused the appointment 
5Herring to Taylor, October 6, 18)4; M21, Roll 14, 
PP.12-14. Mahan, op. cit., p. 215· 
6carey A. Harris to Father Samuel Mazzuchelli, ~ay 23, 
1835; M21, Roll 16, pp. 1)9-140. 
7Kenneth 1£. Colton, "Father P.'.azzuchelli's Iowa 1v.18­
sian, I. Annals of Iowa, Third Series, XXI, (July, 193?-April, 
1939), p. 297. 
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in favor of Lowry prompted him to make verbal assaults on 
Street (who supported Lowry without reservation) I although 
IVlazzuchelli hardly knew Street. Mazzuchelli I s a ttl tUde re­
flected his close friendship with both Hercules Dousman and 
Joseph Rolette t American Fur Company traders who hoped to 
8
operate through Mazzuchelli to disrupt the school. 
Mazzuchelli defamed Street. "Do not trust General street he 
is a real liquorite and a bad man I say this although I never 
spoke to him. ,,9 IVlazzuchelli criticized Lowry and called 
for his termination as Winnebago teacher, but was informed 
by the War Department that Lowry and his wife II •••were 
strongly recommended to the favorable consideration of· the 
government.'1 10 Zachary Taylor suspected American Fur Company 
intrigue sparked Mazzuchelli's intense agitation. In a 
letter of July 2, 1835, to Clark, Taylor fumed that Lowry, 
an American, was criticized by a IIforeigner" and Italian 
Catholic priest II •••at the instance of a few individuals 
concerned with the American Fur company.,,11 
8Colton, Opt cit., p. 305. 
10Harris to Mazzuchelli, May 23, 1835; Roll 16, pp. 
139-140. 
11zachary Taylor to William Clark, JUly 2, 1835; Bureau 
of Indian Affairs; Letters Received, 1824-1881; National 
Archives, Record Group 75. Series M2)4, Roll 697. (Herein­
after referred to as M2J4.) 
•
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In spite of delays and Mazzuchelli's protests, street 
believed the school would ultimately enjoy great Success, 
Everything now bids fair to the entire success 
of these interesting experiments, if the means set 
apart for the Indians are properly applied to the 
intended object-the turning the attention of the 
Indian from a roaming life, dependent upon the suc­
cess of his hunting, .to a setf~ed life, dependent 
upon the success of the soil. 
Farming operations commenced under Street's careful supervi­
sion in early spring of 1835, but Street departed within a 
month for Rock Island, arriving there around April 1, 1835. 
In April, six pupils enrolled in the schad.; another three 
enrolled the following month. Those developments encouraged 
street to inform Herring, somewhat prematurely, that the 
school's success was assured. i ] Herring remained reserved 
in his jUdgments. He was discouraged by the slow pr~gress 
a.nd meagre enrollment, and failed to discern the reasons 
for street's unbounded optimism. Herring wrote Taylor in 
September, 1835, advising him that unless the number of 
pupils increased, the teacher's pay would be reduced propor­
tionately.1 4 Herring acknowledged the formidable obstacles 
confronting the school and retarding its growth, he noted 
12Ida !Vi. Street, itA Chapter of Indian History, II !.nnals 
of Iow~, Third Series, III (1897-1899), p. 619. 
13"". h· an Ope. cit., p.1;la· .• , 214. 
14'H . , 
..errJ.ng to Taylor, September 5, 1835; M21, Roll 17, 
pp. 51-54. 
8) 
that detractors sought to thwart the school's infant SUccess. 
He instructed 'l!aylor to inform any detractors that " ••• the 
attainment of these objects is utterly impossible." meaning 
that the school would flourish in spite of adverse criti­
cism .15 
In February, 1837, Wisconsin Territorial Governor 
Henry Dodge (of the lead mines confrontation of 1827-1828) 
visited the school and was favorably impressed with its oper­
ation. street's son Thomas, who accompanied Dodge on his 
inspection, wrote his father at Rock Island, apprising the 
elder street of Dodge's favorable reactions 
Gov. D. expressed much satisfaction at the man­
ner in which the School & Farm were conducted, & 
told Mr. Lowry that so far as his influence ex­
tended, he would sustain the establishment notwith­
standing t.. he exertions he knew were making it put
it down. 16 
Dodge was seemingly av·mre, much as was Taylor, of opposition 
aligned against the school. More significantly, Dodge real­
ized Street's influence was crucial to the school's success. 
Dodge allowed Street to return to Prairie du Chien, if Street 
so desired i Dodge said. "l have left it to his discretion 
to come back now or in the spring, or remain where he now is 
15Herring to Taylor ,. September 5, 1835; M21. Roll 17, 
pp. 51-54. 
16Thomas street to Joseph street, February 16, 1837; 
Joseph Montfort street Letterbook, held by the Iowa state 
Department of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa, p. 82. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Letterbook.) 
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as it may suit his convenience .u 17 Street quickly returned 
to Prairie du Chien. Two months after Dodge's February 
visi t to the school, street was again living at Prairie du 
Chien. street busied himself with improving and sustaining 
the school. He concentrated on increasing the enrollment 
which had grown slowly in his absence because of the 
Indian's migratory life-style, American Fur Company opposi­
tion to the school's advancement,. and the regrettable lack 
of an Indian agent overseer to guide the school's progress. 
Taylor, as commandant of Fort Crawford, had been responsible 
for the school's operation, but military obligations under­
standably occupied much of his time. street's efforts re­
sul ted in a near doubling of the enrollment to forty-one 
pupils, fifteen boys and twenty-six girls .18 Farming opera­
tiona expanded under Street's tutelage; about 150 acres were 
broken up, and more Indians settled near the school. 19 Over 
one-fourth of the pupils enrolled boarded at the school, 
while the remainder lived with their families near the 
school. The school provided some rations of pork, sal t, and 
20
meat, plUS clothing for each student as it was needed. 
17Thomas Street to Joseph Street, February 16 , 1837; 
Letterbook, p. 82. 
18Street to Harris, October 21. 1837: 00234, Roll 729· 
20.....Mallan, lac. cit. 
8.5 
Increased attendance resulted in additions to the teacher's 
staff. Bradford and Patsey Porter of Kentucky were appointed 
as assistants to Lowry. Their salary, identical to that of 
21Lowry's wife, Mary Ann, was $300 per annum. 
By October 1837, the school faced bright prospects. 
Enrollment had increased substantially and street believed 
the Winnebago could learn farming techniques and eventually 
adopt an agricul tural way of life. The farm had improved 
greatly--more land was put under cuI tivation, and whiskey had 
been kept f rom I nians 1" and. near, t e f arm. 22d · l.Vlng on, h 
street said that " ••• a t the present school & Farm, Mr. Lowry 
touches not a single drop-and no intoxicating drink is per­
mitted to come on the farm. ,,23 
However. a treaty negotiated with the Sac and Fox in 
September, 1837. affected the school's future. By the 
treaty's provisions, the Sac and Fox ceded a long, tapering 
area of land west of the Black Hawk Purchase of 1833;24 near­
ly one and a quarter million acres were sold to the United 
States for $377,000. 25 The land cession necessitated the 
21.filahan t op. cit., 214-215. 
22Street to Harris, October 21, 1837; M2]4, Roll 729· 
23Ibid . 
24 .1 11
·l.am' J. Peterson, trhe Story 0 f Io~~, I (Y k I• New .orVn. 
Lewis storical PUblishing Company, 1952), pp. 14)-146. 
25Ib '·1.le • 
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establishment of a new Sac and Fox agency west of the ces­
sion region. Street was appointed its agent, and in 
January, 1838, journeyed to the Des Moines River to select 
an agency site. 26 street's supervision of the school 
ceased then, but he preserved a keen interest in its opera­
tion until his death in May, 1840. After street's departure 
from Prairie du Chien, the school continued to flourish for 
a time. I t reached its peak enrollment in 1839; seventy­
nine students, forty-three boys and thirty-six girls, were 
enrolled. 27 Unfortunately, success was short-lived. On 
October 1, 1840, the War Department ordered all teachers 
that due to declining enrollment, their services were no 
28longer needed, and the school closed. 
The school failed for a combination of reasons; falling 
enrollment, Street's absence, American Fur Company opposition, 
and a lack of interest on the part of acting Indian agents 
assigned to Prairie du Chien after street's transfer. 
street wrote in October, 18371 "Lowry has experienced a 
continued series of difficulties from the failure on the part 
of acting agents to pay attention to the progress of the 
26Street to Harris, January 9, 1838; M2J4, Roll 730. 
27Mahan, Opt cit., p. 216. 
28Ibid • 
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School or farm. ,,29 Those factors combined to undermine the 
school •s viability. Street never knew of its failure-he 
died in May, 1840 , five months before its closing. 
Failure of the school rested, at least in part, upon 
American Fur Company opposition. The Company feared Indians 
educated at the school would become sedentary and agricul­
tural, and destroy the fur trade. Father Mazzuchelli acted 
as the Company's most ardent detractor of the school. Ef­
forts to hobble the school t s operation stimulated Street's 
anti-Company sentiment to new heights. An incident which 
took place in March, 1835, prior to Street's arrival at Rock 
Island, fanned his intense animosity towards the American 
Fur Company. 
On l\(jarch 26, 1835, Hercules Dousman renewed his 
efforts to eliminate street. In a letter to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Elbert Herring, Dousman, who claimed to be 
speaking on behalf of disgruntle~ Winnebago at Prairie du 
Chien, alleged that the blacksmith hired to work exclusively 
for the Winnebago (as per 18J2 treaty provisions), in reality 
worked for himsel f on non-Indian jobs. The blacksmi th sup­
posedly closed his shop to do work for inhabitants of 
Prairie du Chien. Further, the blacksmith was said to have 
labored at least two months on the vl'innebago school during 
29street to Harris, October 21, 1827; M2J4, Roll 729· 
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the summer of 1834. 30 Dousman laid blame for the alleged 
misconduct on street. As agent, Street should have pre­
vented the blacksmith from performing jobs other than those 
specifically done for Winnebago tribe members. Dousman 
lamented that his earlier complaints against street had 
availed him nothing, and expected the same result: 
•.• it appears to me from what I have seen, to be 
almost a useless task to charge malpractice to any 
person connected with the Indian Department, yet I 
am constrained to call your attention of some of 
the affairs at this place. j1 
To substantiate his charges, Dousman provided three affida­
vi ts of men attesting to the validity of Dousman I s charges. 
Those sworn statements were witnessed and verified by the 
Justice of the Peace at Prairie du Chien, none other than 
Hercules Dousman, a point which rendered their value as 
legitimate testimony suspect because of Dousman's role in 
bringing the charges to light in the first place. 32 
The War Department received Dousman's charges on May 
6, 1835. 33 The Department ordered an investigation and 
directed Zachary Taylor to supervise it. Following an in­
vestigation, Taylor reported to Clark in July, 183.5, that 
he believed Street to be guilty neither of impropriety nor 
JOHercules Dousman to Herring, March 26, 183.5; 
Letterbook, p. 55. 
32Ibid. 
J3Kurtz to Dousman, May 6, 1835; M21, Roll 16, p. 47. 
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ps 
neglect of duty.34 Work on the Winnebago school, a school 
buil t at the instigation of Congress, benefitted the Winnebago 
as a whole and did not conflict with the blacksmith's other 
duties. Taylor stated that the disputed work done for Prairie 
du Chien residents was done only during slack periods when 
no jobs existed for the blacksmith or when materials were 
unavailable for those tasks. The blacksmith used his own 
tools and materials, not those supplied by the government, 
for all non-Indian projects. 35 Taylor reported he person­
ally found the blacksmith's shop open at all times he passed 
through Prairie du Chien, and found" ••• the smith ready & 
willing to perform work that might be required of him for 
the Indians at any moment. 1136 In response to the charges, 
Taylor questioned Dousman' s motives in bringing them against 
Street. I t was suspicious, Taylor reasoned, that if the 
Indians were as upset over the problem as Dousman stated they 
were, they would delay nearly six months before filing a 
complaint. Taylor believed the Indians would have complained 
much sooner, had the problem actually existed. When they 
did finally complain, they were II ••• induced to do so, by 
promises, and giving them ardent spirits.,,)7 Taylor roundly 
34Taylor to Clark, July 2, 1835: M2J4, Roll 697· 
...J51b la.. 
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condemned Dousman and American Fur Company meddlings in 
Indian affairs. War Department inactivity further irritated 
Taylor, prompting him to remark that should the Department 
not see fit to combat Company excesses and designsl 
r would prefer being relieved at once from that 
duty. and would recommend that the Agency be turned 
over to the agents of said company who appear to 
consider ••• everything connected 'W~th the Department 
as measurably belonging to them.) 
Taylor's report, joined by street's denunciation of all 
charges, joined together to discredit Dousman's charges. 39 
Clark supported Taylor's conclusions that the charges against 
Street were unfounded and unjust, affirming Taylor's observa­
tions that Street was a well-qualified agent and a man of 
considerable moral character. 40 
Dousman's second attempt to discredit Street failed. 
street became even less restrained in his vociferous denun­
ciations of the Company and its exploitation of the Indians. 
In November. 1836, street wrote that II ••• The traders look 
at the Ind. annuities as belonging to them and make all 
their calculations accordingly, with much more certainty 
1l41than a merchant can count his customers. In a letter to 
J8Taylor to Clark, July 2, 1835; M2)4, Roll 697. 
391Viahan. op. cit.. p. 208. 
40Clark to Herring, August 27, 1835r M2J4, Roll 697. 
41street to Brother, November 7. lB)6r Letterbook, 
p. .57· 
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Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey A. Harris (who served 
in that post from July 4, 1836 to October 22, 1838), street 
stated: 
I am grieved to see the individuals who have 
come on with these seemingly devoted Indians. 
Heartless traders who look only to the Indians 
as a means of putting their hands in the Treasury ••• 
and their conductors & friends, who accompanied 
them ••• looking to the treaty a lone as a means of 
giving them some money, or cutting out4~ome situa­
tion for their support of the Indians. 
Street blasted traders who sold Indians whiskey. predicting 
doom if whiskey-sellers were not halted. Street cited his 
influence in restraining the whiskey trade, an influence cur­
tailed by his transfer to Rock Island in 1834: 
So that since I left there Indians they have 
become drunken & are getting debased, and if some­
thing is not done to stop the current of ardent 
spirits pouri.ng upon them ••• thei~ ruin and indeed 
annihilation is not far distant.Ll-3 
Street intimated that unless all Winnebago finally removed 
west of the IVdss issippi ,. they would be beyond any governmental 
help. Street had previously made that point in conjunction 
with trader interest in removal, and street's applied efforts 
to implement removal: 
Since 1833. the Sec of War LCas~, acting under 
the influence of Rolette, Dousman, and their friends, 
has so completely thwarted my benevolent plans for 
the benefit of the Indians, and hampered me with 
42Street to Harris, October 21, 18)7; M2)4, Roll 729. 
43Ibid • 
-~----------••.
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petty complaints, and the suspension of amounts 
f?r singular and ~nnual reason~, that they have f 
wlth occurrence~4ln my own famlly, pecuniarily
embarrassed me. 
Street continued to support removal after h.l·S agency 
shift to Rock Island in early 1835· Indian-white conflicts 
and fur trader's commercial sUbjugation of the Indians lent 
support to a removal program which prevented Indian exposure 
to the less desirable facets of white society. Traders 
could logically follow Indians west, but the Indian move­
ment west of the Mississippi would upset established trade 
pa tterns, routes, and trading houses, all of which would 
cause the trader additional labor and expense in following 
tile Indian trade. By aiding the Indians to slowly adopt 
elements of white society in a controlled environment which 
stressed education and farming, they would ideally become 
sedentary and merge wi th the mainstream of society. Herring 
shared street's point of view. He elaborated on that view­
point in a letter to Street dated June 16, 1835. For the 
Indians, he stated: 
••• there is nothing strange (as they seem to think 
there is) in the increasing population and prosP7r­
ity of the white people; that it is owing to the7r 
love of peace and industriousness and 1!0rmal hab7ts, 
that everyone attends to his own partlcular bUS1­
ness, as a Mechanic, or Farmer. or Merchant, or a 
44street to Brother, November 7. 1836; Letterbook, 
p. 57· 
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professional man. And that if their people will 
follow the same course, the same benefi ts will 
attend them. 45 
Herring's overly simplistic statement stressed white society's 
advantages for the Indian in a grandiose and somewhat theor­
etieal manner. street agreed the Indians cOIHd profit tre­
mendously by adopting positive aspects of white culture such 
as farming and education, but believed satisfactory comple­
tion of those ends were best accomplished by removing the 
Indian population. 
Wi th that in mind, Street suggested to Congressman 
George iii. Jones in January, 1836, the removal of the Rock 
Island agency to some point farther west of the Mississippi. 
Street's appraisal of the Des Moines River area was a favor­
able one. If the agency was located there, the Indians at­
tached to it would cross no white lands to reach it, and it 
would be well within the confines of Indian lands. 46 Jones 
concurred wi th Street's recommendation. Jones cited the 
Indian's hardship in traveling to either Prairie du Chien 
or Rock Island. Crossing white-held lands was a troublesome 
point, as the Indians often fed themselves " ••• a t the expense 
of the farmers of the country. 11 4 7 Clark supported the agency 
45Herring to street, June 16, 1835; M21, Roll 16, pp. 
208-211. 
46street to George Jones, January 25, 18)6; Letter­
book, p. 71. 
47Jonss to Harris, February 16, 1836; M234, Roll 729· 
change, too. Clark wrote Herring on May 26, 1836, that the 
sooner the proposed change took place " ••• the less danger 
will there be of a collision between them and the settlers 
.' . . '"48thone ~lSSlSS1PP1. 
To institute the proposed agency transfer, the gov­
ernment negotiated a treaty in September, 1836, with the 
Sac and Fox who gave up their remaining lands in southeastern 
Iowa in return for lands situated on the Des Woines. At that 
time, discussion was under way, exploring the possible acqui­
sition of all Indian lands on the Des Moines. The discus­
sions transpired well before the agency was established; 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey A. Harris wrote Secre­
tary of War Benjamin Butler on January 9, 1837, suggesting 
the purchase of Sac and Fox terri tory on the Des Moines in 
exchange for lands south of the Missouri River. Removal 
stimulated the discussions, but Harris revealed another mo­
tive which represented an economic influences "The Country 
yet claimed by them, says the Governor of Wisconsin, is not 
surpassed in the Uni ted States or Terri tory, and contains 
upwards of 10 million acres .,,49 The American Fur Company 
opposed the purchase, Harris stated, because of the diffi­
cuI ties traders encountered in following the Indian bands 
48Clark to Herring, May 26, 1836; M234, Roll 729. 
49Harris to Benjamin Butler, January 9, 1837: M21, 
Roll 20, pp. 402-404. 
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to the Des Moines and" .•• the members of the American Fur 
Company find it much more profitable to keep the Sac and 
Fox located near them. u50 By the Company's thinking, the 
Mississippi's east side was the ideal placement for Indians 
inhabiting the upper Mississippi River valley. 
Sac and Fox removal was eventually completed, but not 
until after Street's death in 1840. street entertained no 
ideas similar to Harris' proposal of April, 1837, but rather 
busied himself with garnering support £or the Sac and Fox 
agency. street's request to be allowed to remain agent for 
the Sac and Fox was approved by the War Department. He be­
lieved that his qualifications as an Indian agent were un­
matched by anyone. 
You know my influence with the Sac & Faxes. 
and I feel confident that no person has a greater 
influence than I have with the Winneabogoes LSi£7 
of the Mississippi I & the lower Wisconsin and mil 
knowledge of the Sac & Foxes and Winneabagoes L8i£7 
their situation & their country is inferior to no 
man in this section of the country.51 
street's self-esteem bordered on arrogance at times. He 
firmly believed that his grasp of Indian a£fairs was second 
to none on the frontier. Street grounded his self-confidence 
50Harris to Benjamin Butler, January 9, 1837: M21, 
Roll 20, pp. 402-404. 
51street to Henry Dodge, lV,ay 18, 1837; John Peter 
Bloom ( edi tor and compiler), ;rhe Terri torlal PaQers of the 
United States, XXVII (Washingtonl National Archives, 1969), 
p. 790. (Hereinafter referr~d to as Papers.) 
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in his triumphs in endeavors like the Winnebago school and 
his refutation of both sets of Dousman's charges. Those two 
examples in particular convinced Street that he exercised a 
unique mastery of Indian affairs which permitted him wide 
latitude in dealing with any Indian problem. 
One interesting Indian problem arose while Street was 
ass igned to Roc k Island. Annuity payments were treaty pro­
visions which gave Indians stipulated quantities of goods or 
amounts of money (or both) annually. In return, the Indians 
made certain concessions, usually land cessions. Disagree­
ment flared among the Sac and Fox in January, 18)8. relative 
to the method of annuity payments. A number of Sac and Fox 
had petitioned Congress in January. 1835, asking that pay­
ments be made to heads of households or individuals. rather 
than chiefs. They complained that the annuities were not 
divided equally, and the annuity procedures were too cumber­
52some. Signed by 308 braves, the petition protested annuity 
payments made directly to chiefs. especially Keokuk. who 
turned the paYment over to the American Fur Company for 
incurred debts. 53 At first. Street acted in the role as 
arbitrar, since his official powers endowed him with control 
over disbursement of the annuities, but not the expenditure. 
5'''GHouse Document No.6); 2)rd Cong •• 2d Sess.; M2J4, 
Roll 729. 
5JIbid • 
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It agitated street, however, that most annuities went direct­
ly into Company coffers to satisfy sUbstantial Indian debts. 
Lieutenant John Beach, an officer stationed at Fort Crawford 
(and Street's future son-in-law as we1l as successor as 
agent), informed Herring that the Indians desired cash an­
nui ties paid in specie to meet Company debts, but II ••• the 
money merely passes through the hands of the Indians into 
those of the traders or Fur Company.1I54 street worried lest 
tribal resentment be vented in inter-tribal rivalries I or 
find expression in hostilities perpetrated against whites. 
street reported the dispute's sett1ement in June, 
1836. A council of Sac and Fox decided to retain the much­
used, standard method of payments made to chiefs. 55 The Sac 
and Fox told Clark (through street) on August 15, 18)6: 
It is the wish of the Sac & Faxes to have 
their annuities for 1837, paid in money to their 
chiefs. In a full council of the Chiefs and head 
men of the Sac & Faxes we came to this resolve •. ,6
We have made no change, and we now say the same. 
Settlement features reflected only the interests of Indian 
leaders. Disagreement over annuity payments continued to 
cause trouble within the Sac and Fox confederation. Clark 
54John Beach to Herring, July 251 18)5; M234, Roll 729· 
55Street to Clark, June 12, 1836; M2)4, Roll 729· 
56Sac & Fox to Clark, August 15. 1836; M2J4, Roll 729. 
98 
reported to Harris in December, 1836, that a band of dissi­
dents visited him in St. Louis. They requested permission 
to travel to Washington to personally present a detailed 
description of the annuities problem, but Clark refused them 
that permission. 57 They told Clark of one Sac and Fox band 
which received no annuities; others were alloted but a frac­
tion of' the correct amount. Clark saidl t'There appears to 
me nothing more than strict justice in allowing them in 
future a proportionate share of all annuities payable to the 
nation at large. 1l58 In June, 1837, a group of Sac and Fox 
informed Street that they had received none of the year's 
alloted annuity payment. street promised to secure their 
money. To fUlfill his commitment, street personally led a 
party of Sac and Fox downriver to St. Louis to place their 
predicament before Clark. Street told the Sac and Fox at 
st. Louis I IISince I carne amongst you I have ever endeavored 
to consul t your wishes in the payment of your money, and 
this has now induced me to accompany you to this Place. 1I59 
When the Indians had presented their case to Clark, street 
urged them to return home and remain peaceful. Official re­
action to street' s St.Louis expedition stemmed from Harris 
57Clark to Harris, December 31, 18)6; M2)4, Roll 729. 
59street to Harris, June 26, 18)7: M2)4, Roll 729. 
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the following month. Harris incredulously told Street that 
he could hardly believe Street had allowed the Indians to 
travel 300 miles to st. Louis, let alone accompany them 
there. 60 Harris deplored the trip' s cost, and warned Street 
that he left himself open for a salary suspension by his 
unauthorized absence from Rock Island, although no action 
was taken. 61 No concrete, permanent settlement was forth­
coming to correct the annuities controversy, and Street 
therefore elected to dramatically draw the matter to offi­
cial attention. While he definitely succeeded in pUbliciz­
ing the point, no policy alteration occurred in the payment 
method. street believed that the St. Louis expedition en­
deared him to the Sac and Fox as a trusted white man, in­
tent upon aiding the Indians, but above all else f keeping 
his word when it was once given: 
E'or these Indians appear greatly attached to 
me •.• I feel confident that the S. & F'. would even 
submi t to have an amount equal to my salary paid 
me out of tg~ir annuities, sooner that I should 
leave them. 
The St. Louis venture was not without official reper­
cussions. In August. 1837, Henry Dodge ordered street to 
60H·.. ,
·arrl.S to Street. July 17. 1837: M21, Roll 22. pp.
117-120. 
61 Ibid • 
628 treat to Brother I November 7f 18371 etterbook, 
p. .5 7 • 
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take a Sac and Fox deputation, consisting of such notables 
as Black Hawk, Keokuk, Poweshiek, and Appanoose, to Washing­
63ton by October 1, 1837- Ostensibly, the trip was designed 
to secure peace between dissident Sac and Fox and Sioux 
tribes in Iowa, but the discussion of annuities was also 
to be held. The government felt the need to impress the 
Indians with the power of the United Sta tes to alleviate any 
nascent, hostile sentiment towards the country. Harris sug­
gested that street and his Indian charges visit Boston's 
Navy yard, arsenals, armories, fortifica tions, "manufac­
tories", and other public works. Those examples would 
If •••give them an idea of the skills and ingenuity of our 
64people. II The party of twenty-six chief's and braves, five 
women, three children, two interpreters, and a physician 
were, by Harris' order, to be taken to " •• -places of amuse­
ment as will gratify them and afford the largest number of 
66 
our citizens opportunities to see them." Street's trip, 
which included other Eastern cities like Boston and 
Philadelphia, acted as a pacification device to quiet Indian 
unrest. 
6 odge to street, August 8, 1837; r..i234, Roll 729. 
64Harris to Street, October 21. 18371 M21, Roll 22, 
p. 451. 
65street to Harris, september JO. 18J71 M2J4, Roll 729. 
6 ,~ 
°Harris to Street, october 21, 1837; M21, Roll 22. 
p.451. 
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Street had influenced the decision which led to the 
Washington visit. Harris revealed that in a letter to 
Street in October, 1837, while Street was in the company of 
the Sac and Fox deputation. Harris asked street's opinion 
of several proposed changes in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
The proposal of' primary importance ~egarded the payment of 
annuities exclusively in goods rather than any part in 
specie. 67 The government al tered the annuities structure in 
1839 to permit payments in goods. street, acutely aware of 
the drawbacks associated with specie payments, had urged the 
change in January, 1835. He painted a grotesque picture of 
Indian excesses which occurred at annuity payments I "A t 
every payment of Specie Annuity at Fort Winnebago, the most 
shameful scenes of drunkeness & murders among the Indians 
take place. "68 Annuities paid in goods would inhibit the 
flow of whiskey to the Indians--proper food, clothing, and 
related goods would be dispensed, thereby assuring the 
Indians would not squander cash on non-essentials like liquor. 
Ground-breaking commenced at the Des Moines agency in 
January, 1838. street's tenure at Rock Island was marked 
by a preoccupation with the Winnebago school because of the 
67 · ....• 
,HarrlS to Street, October JO, 1837; M2t. Roll 22, 
p. 480. 
68Street to Dodge, January 11, 18371 Letterbook, p.
58. 
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importance street attached to Indian education. One notable 
element apparent at Prairie du Chien, but strangely absent 
at Rock Island, was a continuance of the Street-American 
Fur Company friction. street continued his cri ticism of the 
Company. His cri ticism remained as virulent, but certainly 
less frequent. street's assumption at his transfer to Rock 
Island, namely that his move was Company inspired, seemed to 
have some foundation in truth. Xis residence at out-of-the­
way Rock Island rendered him impotent to combat Company ex­
cesses at Prairie du Chien, although his authority and 
responsibility embraced that place. Overt conflicts be­
tween Street and the Company subsided. street reached the 
realiza tion tha t his escape from innocuous Rock Island could 
be accomplished by an agency transfer to the Des Moines 
River region. He backed that transfer, beginning in 1836, 
arguing in support of the move that it would reduce Indian­
whi te frictions, promote removal, and prevent Company abuses 
of the Indians. Behind his official reasoning, street be­
lieved the Sac and Fox transfer would place him in a more 
active and relevant position such as he had occupied at 
Prairie du Chien. With those considerations in mind. the 
agency's transfer became a reality, and street repaired to 
the Des Moines River agency (called Agency, and later Agency 
City), in January. 18J8. 
.......
 ~-......_---_.­
CHAPTER. VI 
AGENCY, 1838-1840 
Street arrived at Agency in Janu8.ry, 1838. As for the 
location and numbers of the Sac and Fox at the agency, Street 
reported (in 1839) that the Indians were located in scattered 
areas, and in groups of varying sizes. The Sac and Fox 
totaled about 4546 Indians in all, divided into five bands. 
Three of those bands, under Wapello, Appanoose, and Keokuk 
were on the Des Moines River, a division of Wapello's band 
was on the Skunk River, and Poweshiek's band was one hundred 
miles away on the Ioway River. 1 On January 9, 1838, Street 
reported to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey A. Harris 
the estimated costs of breaking up prairie lands for an 
agency farm. Street pegged the c081; at $10,576 to break 
and fence 1248 acres, compared to a cost of $12,480 for the 
same work in adjoining country. The difference in cost, and 
resultant savings, street declared, would arise from his 
shrewd bargaining powers and extensive experience in the 
region. 2 street urged the restriction of "objectionable 
lWilliam J. Peterson,. The stor;::r of Iowa, I/(New Yorkt 
Lewis Historical PUblishing Company. 1952), p. 15b. 
2Joseph ~. street to Carey A. Harris, ~anuary 9, 18J8; 
Bureau of Indian Affairs; Letters Received, 1d24-1881; 
National Archives, Record Group 75; Series M2J4, Roll 73°· 
(Hereinafter referred to as M23~) 
&
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society" from working on the farm, thereby hoping to screen 
undesirable white workers from employment at the agency, and 
exclude those whi tes with "objectionable habi ts", the worst 
of which was whiskey drinking. street wrote Harris that: 
••• I would consider it of first importance and 
immorality; so as to set before the Indians ex­
amples of strict temperance and morality, at the 
same time as we are placing before them improved 
plans of agriculture and domestic economy.J 
Street's desire to prevent liquor importation to the agency 
exemplified his firm conviction that Indian removal from 
close contact with undesirable characteristics of white 
society, in this case liquor, would result in Indian improve­
ment and civilization. street deplored whiskey and its 
disastrous effect upon the Indians. street's "dry" attitude 
was enhanced by an inc ident which occurred in February. 
1838. A party of Sac and Fox, imbibing at a store situated 
on the prairie some forty miles west of Rock Island, became 
drunk, breaking windows and damaging merchandise. In an 
attempt to quell the disturbance, Ross, the proprietor, en­
gaged in a SCUffling match with one Indian in the store's 
yard. Ross knocked the Indian, identified as Little Bear, 
to the ground and " ••• took a fence rail and struck him on 
4
the head as he lay, breaking his skull shOCkingly.1l The 
3street to Harris. January 9. 18)8; M2)4. Roll 7300 
4StrEH~t to Henry Dodge, February J. 1838; M234. Roll 
730. 
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Ross inc ident dramatically strengthened Street's wish for a 
speedy completion of the agency and Indian removal to it. 
Street experienced further anxiety over a small band 
of dissident Sac and Fox, fearing they would hamper his 
efforts at the Indian agency. A small party. of what Street 
labeled as "renegade" Sac and Fox had left the main tribe 
and gone off wi th several white men who exhibited the Indians 
throughout the Uni ted States as a traveling show) For 
publici ty purposes, the whites intended taking the Indians 
to Washington " ••• as an injured people seeking redress from 
6the government." Street was anxious to assure the govern­
ment that the dissidents were not representative of the Sac 
and Fox nation as a whole. A treaty ratified in September, 
1837, had provided for Sac and F'ox land cessions west of the 
Black Hawk Purchase area of 18)2 in exchange for lands si tu­
ated on the Des ines River, and was viewed with favor by 
both parties • Those lands on the Des Moines became the site 
of the Indian agency established by street in early1838, and 
was compatible with Sac and Fox wishes to relocate on that 
river. Street worried lest unfounded complaints by such 
Indian diss idents genera te unsympathetic a tti tudes towards 
the Sac and .F'ox and impair the fledgling agency.7 street 
'street to Harris, February 12, 18)8; M2J4, Roll 730. 
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wrote Wisconsin Territorial Governor Henry Dodge. liThe 
party gone on are low worthless Indians worked upon by the 
cupidi ty of white-men who hope to make money by showing them 
in the towns and villages •••making any story they chose LSii} ,,8 
The Ross trading store incident prompted Harris to write 
street in March, 1838, urging that Sac and Fox removal to the 
agency proceed as rapidly as possibles 
Every circumstance indicates that the Indians 
cannot remain in their present country with com­
fort or prosperity, after the settlement~ of the 
whites shall have mUltiplied among them.~ 
The new country on the Des Moines was itself being pressed 
by white settlements. Street reported to Dodge several 
months after Harris' fli;arch letter, that the Indians were 
sorely in need of food supplies since liThe game has left the 
country as the pressure of the whites is great even to with­
in 8 or 10 miles of the Indian towns .1110 Dodge ordered Street 
to let contracts for the construction of agency buildings, 
but cautioned that the building's should not exceed street's 
initial cost estimate of $3500. 11 Land breaking and 
treet to Dodge, February 14, 1838; M2J4 t Roll 730. 
9aarris to Street, i.:arch 10, 18J8; Joseph r:.ontfort 
street Letterbook, held by the Iowa state Department of 
History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa, p. 87. (Hereinafter 
referred to as Letterbook.) 
10street to Dodge, July 1J, 18)8; LetterboOK, p. 152. 
l1Harris to Street, March 10, 1838; Letterbook, p. 87· 
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construction of two mills was also authorized. 12 
Locating the new agency presented a special problem 
for street. Commissioner Harris suggested it be located at 
least ten miles west of the eastern boundary of Indian land, 
but street objected. Street argued it would most advantag­
eously be 8i tuated on a navigable river in the area, either 
the Ioway, Cedar, or Des Moines. i ) Street advocated a river 
location to facilitate steamboat transportation and supply 
delivery. Food supplies were essential, Street insisted, as 
only preliminary building and land breaking would be accom­
plished the first year of the agency's existence. Little in 
the way of crops could be planted as the farm was as yet un­
sui table for planting crops. Therefore, Indian bands at the 
agency would rely on government foodstuffs to survive the 
agency's first winter. 14 Eventually, the agency was located 
on a prairie four miles northeast of the Des Moines River, 
and about seventy-five or eighty miles west of Burlington, 
well wi thin Indian cQu.ntry boundaries .15 Nevertheless, that 
12Harris to Street, April 7, 1838; Bureau of Indian 
Affairs; Le rs Sent, 1824-1881; National Archives, Record 
Group 75; Series M21, Roll 23, pp. 524-526. (Hereinafter 
referred to as MZ1.) 
13Street to Harris, April '7, 1838; John Porter B~oom 
(editor and compiler), The Territorial Pa~ers of the Unlted 
States, XXVII (Washington, Nailor-tal Archives, 1969), p. 972. 
THerlenafter referred·· to as Papers.) 
14Ibid • 
15Street to Dodge, July 13, 1838; Letterbook, p. 152 • 
· : 
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placement did not rectify supply problems. Street informed 
Harris in May, 18J8, that requisitioned supplies had not 
arrived to feed Sac a.nd Fox Indians who had begun to drift 
in to the agency.16 The undelivered food supplies stipulated 
by 18J7 treaty provisions, caused street great anxiety. He 
wrote Dodge of the Indian's Plight I "Two thirds of their 
number am living upon roots obtained in the Prairies .11 17 On 
account of the supply shortage, street procurred some flour 
and pork, and sent the Indians about $4-00 worth of beef cat­
tIe on the hoof. street told Dodge he bought the Indians 
supplies not only because the government failed to provide 
them, but also to prevent " ••• their Lfndian§1 meddling with 
the stock of numerous settlers that are filling up the 
country almost to the Ind. towns. 111S The supply problem was 
not solved until the late summer of 18J8 when adequate sup­
plies began to arrive. 
street envisioned additional hardships in the construc­
tion of agency buildings. Advertisements for letting con­
struction contracts for agency buildings appeared in two news­
papers, the MissQuri RepUblican and the Burlington Territorial 
16street to Harris, May 26, 1838; M2J4, Roll 730. 
17Street to Dodge, July 13, 18J8; Letterbook, p. 152 . 
18Ibid • 
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Gazette, during the first week of June, 1838.19 Street 
feared little response to the advertisements. Recent canal 
and road building booms had seized Illinois, employing many 
regional construction concerns. Besides that fact, few firms 
sought contracts which would compel them to travel far out 
onto relatively unsettled prairie lands in order to construct 
agency buildings. Last, governmental construction payments 
were made to the contractor only after the contracted work 
was completely finished, as opposed to the more desirable and 
lucrative installment payments common to most other types of 
construction _20 street remarked: III am now apprehensive 
there will be no bid_" 21 
Delays in supply, communication, and construction 
frustrated Street- He relayed his anxiety to Harris in July. 
1838, complaining that repeated delays, affecting every 
phase of the agency's growth, would dishearten the Sac and 
22Fox. Street stated that competent management (namely him­
self) was absolutely essential to the agency's ultimate suc­
cess I a1 though he discovered the implementation of Indian 
agricul ture a formidable task because the Indians were 
19Copy of Advertisements for rl'issouri RepUblican and 
Bur.tingtonrrerritoriCil Gazette, riflay li, 11:138; M2)4, Roll 730. 
20Street to Harris, May 26, 1838; M2J4, Roll 730. 
21 lbid • 
22
street to Harris, July 27, 18)8; M234, Roll 730. 
------.­
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unaccustomed to systematic and sustained manual labor. 2) 
street fel t that by showing the Indians growing crops and 
healthy livestock. they would observe first-hand the 
8uperiori ty of farming over nomadic wanderings I 
If we hope to alter radically their whole char­
acter and manner of life we must place before them 
in bold relief. tangible objects of plain and easy 
comprehension. the dir~ct benefit whereof may be 
felt and experienced. 2 
Concern for the agency's success led street to complain of 
the aforementioned problems to both Harris and Dodge. Street 
apologized. in part. to Dodge for his repeated complaints 
about the agency's problems, but addedl 
•••my great anxiety to be of service to these 
Indians. and if possible to reclaim & civilize them. 
is my only excuse. Depend on it: much of what has 
been expended for the intended benefit of the 
Indians. has been worse than thrown away. because 
it has gone to strengthen a ~5eep error, that, 
Indian~ .cannot be civilized. 
street encountered difficulties of' another type in 
la te 1838 which had nothing to do wi th the Sac and Fox. but 
did relate back to his residence at Prairie du Chien from 
1827 to 1834. A treaty negotiated with the Winnebago (over 
whom street no longer exercised authority) in September, 1837, 
ceded any and all remaining tribal lands east of the 
23Pete rs 0 n , 0 p. cit., p. 157 • 
24,t· t t . ?? 83() 234 Roll 7':<0o ree 0 H8rru'J, Julv ... , 1 c; MO, . ..1' 
')5' 
L. street to Do , July 16, 1838; M2J4, Roll 730. 
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Mississippi Hiver, and forced Winnebago removal west of that 
river after years of hesi ta tion and delay. To compensate 
the Winnebago for the ceded lands, Congress authorized a 
$1,100,000 settlement paid to them. Of that sum, $100,.000 
was set aside for disbursement to one-half and one-quarter 
breed Winnebago as settlement of their pprtion of the land 
claims east of the Mississippi. 26 On July 21, 1838, Secre­
tary of War Joel Poinsett notified Simon Cameron of 
Pennsylvania that he had been appointed commissioner of a 
group charged with examining and settling all half-breed 
claims. 27 Claims made by traders against the "breedu 
Winnebago for incurred debts were ordered to be amicably 
adjudicated. The government selected Prairie du Chien as 
the settlement site of all claims. Cameron, betraying the 
trust bestowed upon him by the government, conspired with 
other commission members and several traders, to force the 
Indians to sell their land claims and then purchased those 
claims at bargain prices. Mixed-blood Winnebago who jour­
neyed to Prairie du Chien to settle their claims were pur­
posely delayed upwards of eighty days to complete a task 
28
which should have taken only two or three days. Those 
26Ida iii. Street, "The Simon Cameron Commission of 
1838," Annals of :IQwa, Third Series, VII (1905-1906 ), pp.
115-116. ---.-­
27Ibid • 
28street to Iviaj or Ethan Allen Hitchcock, January 8, 
18J9r pers, pp. 1127-1134. 
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Winnebago who remained for extended periods of time found 
themselves financially unable to maintain their residence at 
the payment site. rvlany of the claimants (who numbered 
approximately one hundred) became deeply indebted to traders 
who sold them supplies at exorbitant prices; payment for 
purchased goods was supposedly to come from claims settle­
ments. Many Winnebago sold their claims, at sharply dis­
counted prices, to commission members and traders to satisfy 
their debts. Cameron, in particular. bought up substantial 
quantities of depreciated claims. fully intending to redeem 
them at face value later. 29 Some of the claims which were 
eventually satisfied were paid in worthless banknotes drawn 
on Cameron's own bank, a clever piece of chicanery which 
earned for him the derisive sobriquet "Great Winnebago 
Chief. 1l30 
street, aware of the wholesale fraud, denounced 
Cameron and the other participants in the swindle. When the 
claims were finally to be paid, Major Ea than Allen Hitchcock, 
the officer supervising the claims payments, asked street to 
collect the payment money in St. Louis and transfer it to 
Prairie du Chien. which he did. 31 At Prairie du Chien, 
2 treet to Hitchcock, January 8, 1839; Papers, pp. 
11 27-1134. 
30A • HLOwarg,7 N,L8'neely, "Simon Cameron, II ~PJ2., III, 
p. 437· 
31streot, "The Simon Cameron Commission of 18J8," 
pp. 119 -1 ;21 • 
&
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street resisted pressure from American Fur Company agent 
Hercules Dousman, who insisted the payment money be returned 
to st. Louis. By preventing the distribution of the funds 
to legi timate claimants Dousman believed, and correctly so, 
that the Indians economic situation would only worsen. As 
more Indians were forced to rely on eredi t to survive, addi­
tional land claims could be acquired for Cameron, himself, 
and others. street, naturally, refused to return the money.32 
Street's refusal to participate in any fashion in the swindle, 
although the Winnebago were not his direct responsibility, 
drew the ire of Cameron, Dousman, and associates. Hitchcock, 
allied with street, also became a target of their i11­
feeling. Hitchcock wrote street; 
I have crossed the purposes of' a band of greedy 
speculators and brought upon myself the maledictions 
of many who will pretend an infinite degree of sym­
pa thy for the very half-breeds whom they have cheated, 
and almost robbed bY1wha t will boldly be put forth as 
a legal proceeding.J .... 
Hi tchcock urged the payment to the original claims holders, 
4 
not those who ined possession of them through fraud,3
Street, too, indignantly condemned those who cheated the 
Indians. II me, its eems base and unpardonable, tha t men 
et, "1'he Simon Cameron C ommiss ion of 18]8, II p.J 
J.3Hitchcoclc to Street, November 8, 1838: M2]4, Roll 
698. 
34 'r'b" ~,"
.. la, 
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chose (jiisil by the President ••• to see justice done to the 
Inds. and to the halfbreeds t should suffer such speculation 
to go on. II 35 street surveyed the scope of the swindle I 
From the calculations I can make from date 
here. out of 100,000$ the half breeds got about 
.32, or 35,000$ nominally;, for much was paid. in 
mdg Lmerchandis~at high rates out of Mr. 
Lockwoods and the American Fur Companys stores. 36 
Street and Hitchcock corresponded frequently, discussing the 
commission and its accompanying scandal; street roundly de­
nounced all of the " shameful speculations." In spite of the 
extremely private and accusatory flavor of his letters, 
street granted Hitchcock permission to utilize any part of 
those letters if Hitchcock believed some benefit would accrue 
from them: 
••• but if it can be in any way useful in doing good 
to the Door defrauded halfbreeds, use them all as 
you dee~ best for the elucidation of the SUbject. 
and the obtaining of Justice for the ignorant, de­
frauded halfbreeds. 37 ~ 
Largely through the complaints of Hitchcock and 
street to the War Department. a new commissioner was ap­
pointed in January. 18 • to reinspect all half-breed 
claims. 38 The government ordered an investigation of the 
commission in ruary. 1839. Cameron and his cohorts 
J5s <treet to Hitchoock, January 8. 1839; M234 t Roll 699· 
36Ibid. 37Ibid • 
J8Street, "The Simon Cameron Commission of 1838," p. 
&
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defended themselves against the charges of fraud, but the 
inves tigation' s findings were inconclusive. 39 Unsympathetic 
white a tti tudes towards the half-breed Indiana contributed 
to the investigation' s failure. The public directed scant 
attention towards the commission's machinations, as the 
Indian' s fair treatment lost out to white ambivalence. 
street spent much of 1839 involved in the farm's oper­
ation and construction of sundry agency buildings. In 
September, 1839, street wrote T. Hartley Crawford (the Com­
missioner of Indian Affairs appointed on October 22, 1838), 
1 is ting buildings which had been completed. Among them were 
the agent' s house, council house ,smoke house, river ware­
house, and sawmill. 40 Agency progress was a reality in 1839 
despi te Street' s recurring ill-health. However, new charges 
threa tened the agency' s brief existence as Street was once 
again charged with misconduct in office. Those charges 
threatened to permanently cripple the agency' s viability as 
a means to improve the Indian'S lot. 
On November 29. 1839, W. W. Chapman, Iowa's first 
terri torial del egate to Congress I preferred charges against 
Stree t, claiming the t Street withheld annui ties from the Sac 
and Fox in 1838, and in in 1839, and paid those annuities 
39street. liThe Simon Cameron Commission of 1838,11 p. 
183· 
40street to 'I'. rtley Crawford, September 14, 1839; 
002)4. Roll '130. 
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to the American Fur Company.41 Chapman informed Poinsett 
that. 
Many other Jncident§.7 of similar character has 
occurred and I am satisfied that Gen' 1. Street will 
not tend his aid to any measure proposed by the 
government. which has not a t~~dency to promote the 
interest of the Fur Company. 
Crawford apprised street of Chapman's allegations in a let­
ter of December 2, 1839, in which he requested street's reply 
to the charges. 43 street's reply was forthcoming on February 
6, 1840, but he gained personal support from a. variety of 
sources in the interim. The newspaper Burlington Hawkeye 
and Iowa Patriot upheld Street' s integrity and honesty in 
his dealings with the Indians I "We have known General 
street for many years. and believe him to be incapable of 
injuring the red men ••• ,Lin£?' know the interest he has always 
manifested in behalf of the Indians ,,,44 Josiah Smart, an 
interpreter, presented an affidavit to the War Department in 
which he affirmed the propriety of street's actions at the 
1838 annuities payment. The arrangement concocted to give 
Indian annuities over to the American Fur Company was 
41Street to Joel Poinsett. November 29, 1839: Letter­
book. p. 146. 
42 ", . ",1·01.0. 
4'3·· .
"Crawford to Street, December 2, 1839: l'f;21, Roll 27, 
p. 412. 
J+4l1council V/ith the c and Fox in 1840," 12wa Journ'!l 
pi History andPoli:tlcs, XV (1917). pp. 430-433. 
.~------_. 
118 
conceived the night preceding the payment by the Company and 
the Indians themselves. 45 Smart stated: 
Gen'l .. Street has never since I have been with 
him advised or assisted the Inds. to make any 
arrangement with the Am. Fur Company, either for 
annui ty purposes or any other purposes •••His advise 
has always appeared to me to be for the benefit of 
the Indians excluij.~ve of all personal interest or 
favour to anyone. 
W• Phelps , an American Fur Company trader, corrobor­
ated Smart t s testimony and denied any street connection 
wi th the Company. 47 Phelps upheld Street' s actions at the 
1838 annuities payment. declaring that Street disbursed all 
monies fairly at that time. Phelps' testimony on street's 
behalf was ironic in light of Street's earlier confrontations 
with the Company. As Indian removal west of the Mississippi 
finally became reality. the move compelled the Company to 
follow the fur trade. 'riha t reconciled the major point of 
disagreement between street and the fur traders, although 
street continued to experience difficul ties with whiskey 
peddlers. Phelps stated that street had nothing to do with 
the payment in any manner as II •••nei ther the Indians re­
ques ted you to make an examination of Ace Qunts I -nor did we 
45Josiah Smart statement. January 9. 1840: M234, Roll 
730. 
46I...'b· "lQ. 
Ips S tement, January 20, 1840: 1Vl2)4, Roll 
730. 
-------~ .
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ask your aid or receive any from you .,,48 Phelps further 
stated he was present at the 1839 annuity payment and per­
sonally witnessed •• 0 the annuity paid immediately & direct­II 
ly into the hands of the Chiefs themselves •11 49 Phelps 
denied that any Street-American Fur Company conspiracy was 
hatched to deceive and cheat the Sac and Fox. On the con­
trary, Phelps wrote to street: 
So far from doing so, it has appeared to me that
 
you have at various times too violently opposed the
 
Interests of our Company. I can positively state
 
tha t you have never furthesed or attempted to further
 
the Ints. of our Company.~
 
street responded to Chapman's charges in a letter of 
February 6, 1840, to Crawford in Washington. Hitchcock had 
already spoken to Crawford on street's behalf in October, 
1839, B.nd told street: flI am confident you have no occasion 
to give yourself a moment"s concern •• olav I have never 
heard a single individual express a doubt of your integrity.,,51 
Street apologized to Crawford for his tardiness in replying 
to the charges i explaining that he had been prevented from 
48Phelps to Street i February 20, 1840 ; Letterbook, p. 
49Phelps to street, January 20, 1840; M2J4, Roll 730. 
5iHi tchcock to Street, October 17, 1839; Letterbook, 
p. 120. 
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doing so by a fl ••• painfuL and protracted illness. ,,52 Street 
saidl "I should not now in my present state approach the 
sUbject, but for the fear that my long silence might be 
deemed a confession of the truth of Mr. O's. charges. 1I53 
Street branded the charges as ridiculous, refuting them 
much as Smart and Phelps had done. Street adamantly declared 
that annuities allocated for18]8 and 1839 were paid in full 
and according to established governmental procedures. The 
expendi ture of' annuities I whether to the American Fur 
Company or any other source I was outside his jurisdiction 
as an agent. 54 street bitterly condemned Chapman's sketchy 
knOWledge of Indian affairs as well as the role street him­
self played in those affairsl 
• •• his ••• knowle e of me and my official conduct 
amounts to noth more than the pickin..g up and 
string together a few garbled statements & re­
ports se. afloat through the Coul),try by some dis­
appointed creditors of the Inds.)S 
Street accused G pman of being one of those "disappointed 
eredi torsI! whose fraudulent claims against the Winnebago half­
breeds 
treaty 
the Sac 
were 
prev 
and 
disallowed by the government 
ions. street recounted his 
annuities, even ing as 
as part of 1837 
actions when paying 
far as to describe 
528 et to Crawford, February 6, 
bid. 
1840; M234, Roll 730. 
--~---.-
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the manner in which he counted out fifty and hundred dollar 
bills to the chiefs .56 street summarized Ohapman's charges~ 
Whether Mr. Chapman's private opinion of me and
 
my conduct be favorable or not, is a matter of in­

difference. His gra tui tous & malicious attempt to
 
injure me by misrepresenting my conduct & endeavor­

ing to effec t my remova.l for a selfish purpose of
 
his own, I disregard-His weakness I most sincerely
 
pity-My sale object is to show the Dept. that my
 
conduct has not been SUCh as !Vir. C••• has thought
 
proper to represent it. 57
 
Iowa Territorial Governor Robert Lucas reviewed the evidence 
supporting street. That evidence, joined by Lucas' own af­
firmation of Street, formed a weighty core of vindication 
u .' •• which I LLuca.§.7 consider a triumphant refutation of Nfr. 
58Chapman's charges." Lucas transmitted the evidence to 
Crawford in Washington wi th a personal recommendation of 
Street: 
In justice to Genl. street I will state that as
 
far as I have had any intercourse with him he has
 
mainta.ined a deep interest for the welfare of the
 
Is. under his charge, and a willingness at all
 
~imeB to.use h~sbest exertions~o fulfill the
 
lnstructlons of the Department. 5.
 
Before street could be officially exonerated of the charges, 
he suffered an apparent heart attack, so-called "apoplexy", 
and died on 5, 1840, at the Des ines River Sac and Fox 
5 treet to Crawford, February 6, 1840; M2J4, Roll 730. 
1:'7:; Ibid. 
B_SHobert to Street, February 18, 1840; Letter-

book, p. 150.
 
c-;as to Craw rd, February 18, 1840; M2J4, Roll 730. 
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agency. 
The War Department had assured Street's son Thomas in 
April, almost a full month before street's death, that in the 
event of the elder street's continued illness or death, a 
family member would be appointed to succeed him. 60 Accord­
ingly, the Department appointed Street's son-in-law, Army 
Lieutenant John Beach, as street's successor at his death in 
1840.61 
On !fiay 16, 1840. the War Department notified Street f s 
widow that her late husband' s refutation of the Chapman 
charges was It perfectly satisfactory" to the Department, and 
62
officially exonera ted street of those charges. Street's 
endeavors at the Sac and Fox agency met limited success. 
Ini tial cons truction of agency buildings was completed, but 
farming tiona progressed more slowly as the Sac and Fox 
were raluc t to undertake the unaccustomed labors involved 
in farming. eir dislike of farming, combined with the 
problems encountered in establishing an agency from ita 
initial stages, prevented Street from realizing appreciable 
gains for his efforts at the time of his death in 1840. 
6 
• B. Lewls to Thomas P. street, April 6, 1840; 
1etterbook, p. 127­
Ibid. 
esa ••
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
As protector of Indian rights on the frontier, the 
Indian agent labored under tremendous difficulties. Laws 
enacted by Congress to regulate Indian affairs were, all too 
often, short-sighted, inequitable, or expedient statutes 
which were mere s top-gap measures ,. rath'er than a consistent 
policy. If the nebulous character of federal Indian legis­
lation was not a sufficient stumbling block to confound 
every aspect of the agent's position, unsympathetic white 
atti tudes towards the Indians were also integral features of 
the frontier which adversely affected the Indian agent. 
In a basic sense. Indian rights and territorial sover­
eignty were shunted aside in the wake of American expansion­
ism during the 1820'13. 1830's, and 1840·s. The headlong, 
frenetic pace of growing America accentuated the Indian 
problem signlficantly f and consequently the pressing ques­
tions What was to be done with the Indians? The rapidity 
of white expansion rendered a permanent and fair solution to 
the problem virtually impossible. Temporary expedients were 
continually embraced to deal with momentarily acute aspects 
of Indian relations which required some sort of immediate 
attention, but failed of a permanent solution. The overall 
effec t of that CEl tch-as -eatch-can planning was confusion and 
bi tter Indian-whi te an tips thy which only served to further 
------._-­. 
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complicate the agent IS job and render inevitable the persis­
tent and continued push of the Indian further and further 
westward. 
Joseph Montfort Street found himself confronted by 
those serious obstacles. Refusing to be intimidated by the 
difficulties of his office, Street endeavored throughout his 
unusually long tenure of thirteen years as an Indian ag,ent 
to fulfill his official obligations to the Indians under his 
authori ty. tfhrough his official functions, Street attempted 
to stimulate Indian civilization and assimilation into the 
mainstream of white society as the only possible means of 
saving the Indians from extinction. Street's personal view­
point ascribed to such measures. Scrupulously honest, and 
imbued with a compassionate appraisal of the Indian and the 
Indian IS defens iva posl tion on the frontier, Street found his 
efforts to ameliora te the Indians cond1tion blocked by white 
indifference or wh1 te groups which hardly held the best 
interests of the Indians at heart. Frontier elements of the 
whi te population such as the fur traders, miners, or squatters, 
believed the Indian to be a definite hindrance to settlement 
and expansion. As those groups felt little compassion for 
the Indians, they fel t just as Ii ttle about the Indian agent 
whose job it was to administer Indian affairs and protect 
the interests of the Indians. 
S treat bel i eved tha t Indian removal west of the 
Mississippi River would allow the eventual civilization of 
125 
the Indians under his charge. However, street discovered 
even his removal efforts resisted by white groups. The 
American Fur Company, a monopolistio enterprise which en­
joyed a complete strangle hold of the fur trade and there­
fore the Indians, beLieved its commercial supremacy would be 
compromised by Indian removal, and ardently resisted Street t s 
every effort to implement Indian removal. In that manner, 
the Company was but one representation or white attitudes 
which regaiBded the Indian only as a manipulative source to 
be used, or abused ,. to the fullest possible advantage. 
Confronted by such difficul ti es, street's sympathetic 
feeling was, with few exceptions f definitely not in tune 
wi th the bulk of prevailing white sentiments. Consequently, 
Street saw himself as a beleagured champion of the Indian, 
perhaps even a saviour of sorts. That instilled in him a 
moralistic purpose which in turn stimulated a strong sense 
of moral self-righteousness and egotism on Street's part. 
In a strict sense, Street's attitude was justified. His 
staunch and unfal te efforts on behalf of the Indians, in 
the face of overwhelming opposition,. gave him a deserved 
basis for his feelings; Street's adherence to a benevolent, 
paternalistic Indian licy rendered him worthy of a con­
siderable amount of respect. 
Joseph Montfort Street can be appreciated somewhat 
more as a representation of the conflicts within a rapidly 
expanding soc iety thzm merely 3S an individual. While his 
126
 
Qontribution as an Indian agent was important, even that 
role was neceesita ted by a basic Indian-white conflict which 
repea tedly called for a mi tigating force to cushion the im­
pact of white society upon the hapless Indian, who continu­
ally suffered at the hands of white society. street as an 
individual, and Street as an Indian agent, were both symbols 
of the clash of two totally different cultures, one white 
and one Indian, which could not amicably co-exist and there­
fore required an intermediary to deal with affairs between 
the two groups. As the t intermediary, street struggled to 
cope with a solution to the multi-faceted Indian problem, a 
solution which escapes us to this day. 
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